摘要
以探讨在职培训实现劳资利益均衡的过程与条件为目的,分析了劳资在职培训博弈问题的复杂性,给出了劳资在职培训非对称演化博弈模型,并结合我国实际进行了演化路径及其实现条件的分析。劳资在职培训博弈是否最终能够演化为社会所期望的"企业投资,员工合作"局面,取决于对员工在职培训完成后"不合作"行为的有效惩罚力度、在职培训双方收益分配比例以及雇佣关系的维系成本三个关键因素的优化协整。
With a purpose of discussing the process and conditions for in-service training to achieve the balanceof benefits between labor and capital, this paper analyzes the complexity of gaming between labor and capital inin-service training, and offers an asymmetric evolutionary game model for the labor and capital in in-servicetraining. Combined with the realities of China, it also conducts an analysis of the evolutionary path andconditions for its realization. Whether the gaming between labor and capital in in-service training can reach theexpected scenario of “investment from enterprises and cooperation from employees”, it is related with theoptimization and co-integration of three key elements, which are effective penalty on “uncooperative” behaviorsfrom the employees after the completion of in-service training, the proportion of income distribution between thelabor and capital and maintenance cost for the employment relationship.
作者
王明亮
刘三林
WANG Mingliang;LIU Sanlin(School of Economics and Commerce,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangdong Guangzhou,510520,China)
出处
《社会工作与管理》
2018年第6期80-84,96,共6页
Social Work and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"非典型雇佣模式下的合作创新治理研究"(71673061)
广东省自然科学基金项目"新型城镇化背景下的广东劳资关系演化与优化问题研究"(2015A030313496)
广东省哲学社会科学"十三五"规划项目"产业升级驱动下珠三角农民工职业技能提升机制研究:在职培训视角"(GD16CYJ04)
关键词
在职培训
复杂性
演化稳定策略
演化路径
in-service training
complexity
evolutionary stable strategy
evolution path
