摘要
特殊性在职培训是企业与员工之间的一场博弈。企业在决定培训力度时,会受到员工努力程度的影响。另一方面,员工的努力程度又会受到未来预期收益的影响。为了更深入地研究企业与员工之间的博弈行为,推导出企业员工特殊性在职培训收益的最优分享比例,建立了一个企业员工特殊性在职培训的3阶段动态博弈模型,讨论了在培训过程中所存在的“囚徒困境”现象。通过一个无限次重复博弈模型,分析了解决该问题的途径。研究表明,只有当企业更重视长远利益时,特殊性人力资本投资才是一个纳什均衡,即企业按最优力度对员工进行培训,员工才能付出最优努力水平。
Employee＇s special on-job-training is a game between employer and employees. In order to study the game behavior between employer and employee more deeply, the degree of employee＇s pitching in can affects the level of investment in employee＇sspecial on-job-training by firm. and the degree of employee＇s pitching in can be affected by the future expected income. At first, the optimal proportion of sharing income by employee is de- duced. Secondly, a three-stage game model is built to study the ＂Prisoner Dilemma＂ in the course of employee ＇s special on-job-training, and the way to solve the problem is studied. The conclusion is that only when employ- er pay more attention in future income, the special on-job-training can be a Nash-Equilibrum, viz the optimal level of investment and the optimal degree of employee＇s pitching in can be carried out.
出处
《吉林大学学报（信息科学版）》
CAS
2007年第3期325-329,共5页
Journal of Jilin University（Information Science Edition）
基金
吉林省社会科学基金资助项目(2006152)
关键词
人力资本投资
博弈
囚徒困境
纳什均衡
声誉
human capital investment
game
prisoner＇s dilemma
nash-equilibrum
reputation
