摘要
本文将总经理利用权力攫取的超额薪酬视为其在薪酬方面的议价能力，以2005～2010年问A股上市公司的高管个人薪酬数据为样本进行了研究。结果显示，总经理在薪酬方面具有一定的话语权，并且大股东持股比例的提高进一步增强了总经理的议价能力，而国有股持股比例以及独立董事比例的提高，则削弱了总经理的议价能力。与以往研究不同的是，本文在管理者权力理论的基础上进一步考察了经理议价能力的影响因素，不仅为管理者的权力寻租行为提供了新的实证证据，也为如何对这种权力寻租行为进行有效制约提供了新的理论框架和解决思路。
In order to solve agency problem of the modern enterprise organization, shareholders and managers will sign compensation contract, which motivating managers to maximize the shareholder＇s goals and work as hard as possible. Traditional contract theory points out that managerial compensation level will be decided by the board of directors, as the consideration of maximizing shareholder value and minimizing the agency cost, it is the best choice for the board to pay high salaries to managers. However, Bebchuk and Fried （2003）＇s study challenges this theory, they think that managers can use their power to influence board of directors and salary negotiations, so that compensation contracts will sometimes deviate from the optimal level ,which makes the design of compensation contract not only failed to solve the agency problem, but let the agency problems become more serious. Since the power of managers makes them not completely passive accept the compensation contract which designed by the board, and lets them have some negotiate with the board in compensation aspect, then how much the bargaining bargaining power are and which factors power to enhance the managers＇ bargaining power, and which factors limit the managers＇ bargaining power.9 Using Executive compensation data of the A shares of listing Corporation from 2005 to 2010 in the CSMAR da- tabase, this paper studies the bargaining power in compensation aspect of general manager. The results showed that, general manager has certain discourse fight in compensation, the growth of personal power brought about the im- provement of salary level, and the proportion of the first shareholder enhances general manager＇s bargaining power, and the proportion of state-owned shares and the proportion of gaining power. Further study shows that company＇s management on the general manager＇s bargaining power, good performance independent directors limits general manager＇s barsituation in the past will also have some influence in the past which was obviously en
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期55-64,共10页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"管理会计视角的多重价值场域中的经济性激励及其效果研究"(71272114)
关键词
薪酬谈判
议价能力
公司治理
管理者权力
compensation negotiation
bargaining power
corporate governance
managerial power
