摘要
选取2006~2014年沪深两市A股主板上市国有企业为样本,考察薪酬水平、薪酬差距对高管离职的影响。研究发现,国企薪酬差距与高管离职率正相关;且对于高管而言,对比企业较高的内部薪酬差距,及本企业整体薪酬支付水平较好会提升高管留任的可能性,增强薪酬差距的容忍度。因此,国企高管薪酬改革并不会引发离职潮的到来。这一研究结论为国企高管薪酬改革提供了经验证据,为权衡高管薪酬激励政策与聘用契约之间实现最优组合提供了理论支撑。
Using a sample of State-owned Enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange from 2006 to 2014, this paper investigates how compensation level and pay gap affect executive turnover, The empirical results show that, compensation gap of state-owned enterprises is positively related to executive turnover. Further, for the level of executive, when external enterprises have higher internal compensation gap and the state-owned enterprise is a good paymaster, executive turnover is lower and tolerance of compensation gap is higher. Thus, executive compensation reform of state-owned enterprises does not trigger the trend of turnover. Research conclusion of this paper provides empirical evidence for the executive compensation reform of state-owned enterprises, and the theoretical support for the optimal combination of executive compensation incentives and employment contracts.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第10期11-19,共9页
Securities Market Herald
关键词
国有企业
管理层激励
高管薪酬
高管离职
state-owned enterprises, managerial incentives, executive compensation, executive turnover
