摘要
构建农村房屋征收补偿中征收方地方政府和被征收方农户的博弈模型,根据博弈均衡分析农村房屋征收的影响因素,以期为政府制定和完善农村房屋征收补偿相关政策提供参考,从而有利于助推新型城镇化的进程。基于演化博弈理论,分析了农村房屋征收补偿中征收方地方政府和被征收方农户的博弈过程及影响因素,并结合相应的实际案例进行了验证分析。结果表明:地位不平等常会使被征收方农户得不到公平合理的补偿;当农户在农村房屋征收的长期博弈中明了采用抗争策略比合作策略能获得更多的补偿费用时,他们会坚决的采用抗争策略,此时博弈会陷入一个均衡困局;在片面追求经济增长和扭曲政绩观的影响下部分地方政府时常会采用违法征收策略进行暴力强征强拆,此时博弈会陷入另一个均衡困局。因此,应从征收源头上着手减少农村土地和农村房屋征收行为的发生,确保农村房屋征收工作的正当性、合法性、公平性、规范性和可救济性。
With the continuous promotion of the new urbanization,the compensation for rural houses has a direct impact on the process of the new urbanization.Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper analyzes the game process and the influencing factors of the local government and the collected farmers in the compensation for rural houses,and then the above results are explained by corresponding case studies.The results show that:unequal status often makes the farmers of the levied party do not get the fair and reasonable compensation.When the farmers get to know that they can obtain more compensation costs with struggle strategy than the cooperative strategy in the long time game,they will resolutely adopt the struggle strategy,and then the game will fall into an equilibrium dilemma.Under the influence of a one-sided pursuit of economic growth and the distorted political performance outlook,some local governments often use illegal collection tactics to enforce violent demolitions.The game will fall into another equilibrium dilemma.Research conclusions:to reduce the occurrence of rural land and rural housing expropriation from the source of expropriation,to ensure the legitimacy,legality,fairness,standardization and remedies of rural housing expropriation.
作者
夏涛
XIA Tao(Center for Population Development and Policy Research,Chongqing Technology and business Universitcy,Chongqing 400067;School of Society and Public Administration,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067)
出处
《河北农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2019年第5期94-102,共9页
Journal of Hebei Agricultural University (SOCIAL SCIENCES)
基金
重庆社科规划培育项目:“重庆一小时经济圈农用地城市流转与经济增长双向影响的实证研究”(编号:2016PY40)
国家社科基金项目:“基于微观退地主体的宅基地退出增值收益分享研究”(编号:14CJY043)
关键词
农村房屋征收补偿
演化稳定策略
博弈均衡困局
征收源头
compensation for rural housing expropriation
evolutionary stability strategy
game equilibrium dilemma
source of expropriation
