摘要
研究目的:构建征地冲突中中央政府、地方政府、农户三者之间的动态博弈模型,根据均衡概率找出引起征地冲突的关键因素,以期为政府制定和完善征地相关政策提供理论依据。研究方法:综合分析法、博弈分析法。研究结果:(1)地方政府采取违法征地的概率与中央政府的监督检查成本、农户的维权成本呈正向关系,与对地方政府的经济处罚和农户维权后征地补偿标准的提高呈反向关系;(2)中央政府采取监督检查的概率与地方政府违法征地的收益呈正向关系,与对地方政府的经济处罚和政绩的损害呈反向关系;(3)农户维权的概率与地方政府违法征地时的收益呈正向关系,并与农户维权成本、地方政府征地补偿标准的提高和对其政绩的损害呈反向关系。研究结论:降低中央稽查和农户维权成本以及地方政府的违规收益,同时提高征地补偿标准,加大对违法征地的惩罚力度,使利益主体博弈行为趋于合理,可以避免或减少征地冲突的发生。
The purpose of this paper is to develop a mathematically trilateral game model among central government, local government, and peasants in the farmland-acquisition conflicts, aiming to find out the critical factors lead to the conflicts, and to provide theoretical basis for policies reform. The comprehensive analysis and the game theory methods were employed. The game result shows that 1 ） the probability of illegal farmland-acquisition by local government is positive to the supervision and inspection costs of central government and right-safeguarding costs of peasant, however is negative to the economic punishment for local government and the compensation standard improvement of farmland-acquisition. 2） The probability of supervision and inspection by central government is positive to the revenue from illegal farmland-acquisition by local government, but negative to the economic punishment and achievements damage for local government. 3 ） The probability of rights claim of peasant is positive to the revenue from illegalfarmland-acquisition by local government, but negative to the rights claim costs of the peasants, the compensation standard improvement of farmland-acquisition, and the damage to the local government achievements. Research results show that lowering the costs of inspection by central government, the right claim of peasants, and the revenue from illegal farmland-acquisition by local government, meanwhile improving compensation standard of farmland-acquisition, increasing the penalty for illegal farmland-acquisition can make stakeholders＇ game behaviors more reasonable, i.e., effectively avoid or reduce the farmland-acquisition conflict.
出处
《中国土地科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第10期54-60,共7页
China Land Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(09CJY054)
关键词
土地管理
征地冲突
动态博弈分析
中央政府
地方政府
农户
land management
farmland-acquisition conflict
analysis of dynamic game
central government
localgovernment
peasants
