摘要
国家重点生态功能区的设立是完善中国生态补偿机制的重要组成部分。文章首先分析了县级政府生态环境保护的路径选择。随后,根据博弈论混合策略纳什均衡原理,构建中央政府与地方政府的生态补偿博弈模型,利用博弈反应函数求出双方的最优选择,从而找出影响县级政府保护生态环境和中央政府选择实质性监管的主要因素。为保障生态补偿转移支付的实施效果,中央政府在监管中既要加大惩罚力度、增强法律的威慑力,又要增强监管的规范性和效率、降低监管成本。此外,中央政府要加大生态保护技术的研发投入,提高生态环境治理能力,从而降低地方政府保护生态环境的成本。
The establishment of national key ecological function zone is an important part of improving the ecological com- pensation mechanism in China. Firstly, this paper analyses the path selection of county government of ecological resources pro- tection. Secondly, based on the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium principle, the article structures an ecological compensation supervision game model between the central government and county government, use response functions of game theory to calcu- late the game optimal selection between government and enterprise, to find out the main influence factors of the county govern- ment to protect the ecological environment and the central government. Therefore, in order to guarantee the implementation effect, the central government must increase the penalties to strengthen the force of law, and strengthen standardization and ef- ficiency of supervision to reduce the cost of supervision. Moreover, the central government should increase the R ＆ D invest- ment of ecological protection technology, and improve the ability of ecological environment management to reduce the cost of ec- ological environment protection of the country government.
出处
《中国经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第6期87-96,共10页
China Economic Studies
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(11AZD001)的资助
关键词
国家重点生态功能区
生态补偿
转移支付
监管
national key ecological function zone
ecological compensation
transfer payment
supervision
