超额委派董事、大股东机会主义与董事投票行为被引量：61

Over-Appointment of Directors, Opportunism of Large Shareholders and Director Voting

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摘要长期以来被视作董事积极行使监督权力的投非赞成票行为在中国资本市场公司治理实践中无论从数量还是监督效果上都比预期的要少、要差。本文研究发现,实际控制人超额委派董事现象的存在往往对董事以投非赞成票方式履行监督职责构成严重干扰,成为上述结果出现的潜在原因之一。采用2006—2015年A股上市公司样本,本文实证检验了实际控制人超额委派董事对董事投非赞成票行为以及对董事投非赞成票的实际监督效果的影响。研究发现,实际控制人超额委派董事比例越高,董事投非赞成票的可能性越低,超额委派董事程度的一个标准差的变化将引起董事投非赞成票的几率比下降约17%;而以往文献证明的董事投非赞成票所带来的提升经济绩效、降低控股股东以资金占用形式实现的隧道挖掘行为等效应在实际控制人超额委派董事的情形下大打折扣,失去了应有的监督效果。因此,实际控制人没有超额委派董事,成为董事投非赞成票发挥监督效力的一个重要前提条件。由此,本文不仅从董事投非赞成票的视角为“实际控制人超额委派董事是大股东机会主义行为显现”提供了直接的证据,而且识别了董事投非赞成票行为具有监督效力的前提条件。在公司治理实践中,为了提高董事会监督的有效性,需要在诸如董事会组织等制度环节确保不同股东力量之间形成制衡,避免大股东机会主义行为的发生。 Over time,the quantity and supervision effect of director dissension has been less in practice.As a potential cause for such phenomenon,the existence of over-appointment of directors often constitutes a serious interference of the director dissension in performing the supervisory duties.This paper empirically examines how the controlling shareholder’s over-appointment of directors affects director dissention behavior and monitoring effect using the A share data during the period from 2006 to 2015.The study of this paper finds that the higher the proportion of controlling shareholders’over-appointing directors,the lower the possibility that directors vote against board proposals.A standard deviation change in the degree of over-appointment of directors will reduce the odds ratio of director dissension by 17%.The evidence from the previous researches shows that the director dissension can improve the economic performance and reduce the tunneling of larger shareholders in the way of fund embezzlement.But we find that director dissension loses effectiveness when controlling shareholders overly appoint directors.Therefore,whether the controlling shareholders overly appoint directors becomes an important precondition for the supervisory effect of the director dissension.The research not only provides direct evidence for the fact that the controlling shareholders over-appointing director is the opportunistic appearance of the major shareholder from the perspective of the director dissension,but also identifies the preconditions for the supervisory effect of the director dissension.Therefore,in the practice of corporate governance,so as to improve the effectiveness of board monitoring,we should not only encourage directors to dissent in terms of culture,but also ensure balances between different shareholders’force in institutional design to avoid major shareholder opportunism.

作者郑志刚胡晓霁黄继承 ZHENG Zhi-gang;HU Xiao-ji;HUANG Ji-cheng(School of Finance,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区中国人民大学财政金融学院

出处《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第10期155-174,共20页 China Industrial Economics

关键词超额委派董事实际控制人大股东机会主义董事投票行为 over-appointment of directors controlling shareholder opportunism of large shareholders directors'voting behavior

分类号 F272 [经济管理—企业管理]