摘要
以中国2013—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从内部兼任网络视角出发,实证研究了战略委员会和审计委员会交叠任职对企业资产剥离决策及剥离效果的影响。研究发现:在资产剥离决策方面,战略委员会与审计委员会非独立董事交叠任职比例越高,企业选择资产剥离战略的可能性越大;在资产剥离效果方面,由于大股东机会动机或委员会成员履职冲突,企业通过资产剥离缓解经营压力、聚焦核心优势、提升经营绩效的积极战略效果在战略委员会和审计委员会交叠任职的情景下无法完全发挥。
Using the samples of China’s A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2020,this paper empirically investigated the impact of the overlapping appointment of strategic committee and audit committee on the decision-making and effect of enterprise assets divestiture.The results showed that,higher proportion of non-independent directors’overlapping appointments was more likely for corporates to select the strategy of assets divestiture.Considering divestiture effect,corporates originally aimed to relieve operating pressure,focusing on core advantages and promoting operating performance.However,because of the opportunism of large shareholder or the performance conflict of committee members,assets divestiture may not fully exert its positive effect.
作者
薛有志
张荣荣
张钰婧
XUE You-zhi;ZHANG Rong-rong;ZHANG Yu-jing(China Academy of Corporate Governance/School of Business,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期84-98,共15页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71372092)
关键词
资产剥离
战略委员会
审计委员会
交叠任职
信息溢出
股东机会主义
董事网络
asset divestiture
strategy committee
audit committee
overlapping appointments
information overflow
shareholder opportunism
director network
