摘要
本文利用中国特有的强制披露数据,即中国上市公司独立董事对董事会议案发表意见和进行投票的数据,考察了独立董事相对于管理层的独立性及其监督作用。本文发现,绝大多数情况下独董并不会公开质疑管理层行为,这在一定程度上符合Mace(1986)对独董投票权属于橡皮图章的描述。然而,当公司业绩不佳时,独董更有可能对管理层行为提出公开质疑;并且,声誉越高、具有财务背景、任职时间早于董事长任职时间的独立董事更有可能对管理层决策提出质疑。进一步研究发现,存在异议独董的公司市场价值也更高。这表明当公司面临危机时,独立董事能够发挥监督作用,并且独立董事的监督行为能够缓解代理问题,提高公司价值。
Chinese listed firms are required to disclose the board voting results on management proposals. Using the unique data, we explore the independence of outside directors. We document that only 4% of firms have dissenting directors who vote against management proposals at least once, which is consistent with the claim by Mace （1986） that outside directors are not quite effective. Furthermore, we find that independent directors are more likely to vote against management proposals when firms perform poorly, and when independent directors have higher reputation, have financial or accounting background, and with a longer tenure. We further document that the firms with dissenting directors enjoy higher market value. Our findings suggest that independent directors become more effective during crises, and the monitoring by independent directors improve firm value.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第1期126-139,共14页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71072145
70972011和70802003)
对外经济贸易大学"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目(项目批准号:73400050)的资助
