摘要
为培育我国双向国际直接投资合作与竞争的新优势,有必要利用契约法律制度平衡东道国和投资者之间利益关系。博弈分析结果显示,充分保障投资契约效力的制度模式能够增加投资合作的可能性与稳定性,合理的执行保障与违约救济制度可改善效用配置和制度激励。为实现公平与效率的双重目标,我国在国际直接投资制度安排上,应加强投资契约的强制性约束,同时针对性地进行条约和制度设计,保护我国海外投资的安全,同时实现博弈双方或多方利益主体的共赢。
It is necessary to balance the relationship of interests between the host country and the investors by means of contractual legal system in order to foster the new advantages of China’s two-way international direct investment cooperation and competition. The game analysis results show that the institutional model that fully guarantees the effectiveness of investment contract can increase the possibility and stability of investment cooperation and proper enforcement guarantee and default remedy system can improve utility allocation and system incentive. In order to achieve the dual goals of fairness and efficiency, China should strengthen the mandatory constraint of investment contract in the international direct investment institutional arrangement and make targeted treaty and institutional design to protect the safety of China’s overseas investment and achieve a win-win situation between the two or more parties in the game.
作者
田柯
TIAN Ke(School of Economics,Henan University,Kaifeng 475004, China)
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第7期153-160,共8页
China Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(17BJL122)
河南省社科联、省经团联调研课题(SKL-2018-3096)
关键词
博弈论
双向直接投资
制度安排
投资契约
game theory
two-way direct investment
institutional arrangement
investment contract
