摘要
在信号成本很低的情况下,家族企业在劳动力市场信号传递过程中体现出一定的特殊性,其中"泛家族"关系尤其值得关注。本文将求职者所发信号进一步划分为"高成本"和"低成本"两种类型,认为家族企业逆向选择问题产生的一大原因在于"泛家族"关系作用于低成本信号的传递过程,使"泛家族"成员的能力容易获得高估,并指出"泛家族"成员具有现实生活中易被忽视的"双层三重"信号传递优势,最后从企业决策制度化与良好信息链构建两个方面探讨应对策略。
Family enterprises have some particularity in the process of labor market signaling when the cost of signal is low.＂Quasi-family＂relationship deserves special attention.This paper divides the signals sent by job seekers into ＂high-cost signal＂and ＂low-cost signal＂.Adverse selection in family enterprises can be largely attributed to the influence of＂Quasi-family＂relationship on the transmission of low-cost signals that leads to an overestimation of the ability.It is pointed out that ＂Quasi-family＂candidates have＂two layers-three types＂of advantages which are commonly neglected.Finally,the paper discusses the coping strategies from the systematism of business decisions and the solid construction of information chain.
作者
徐萌娜
王明琳
XU Mengna;WANG Minglin(School of Economics and Management,Hangzhou Normal University,Hangzhou 311121,China)
出处
《上海商学院学报》
2018年第4期36-41,共6页
Business Economic Review
基金
浙江省自然科学基金项目(LQ14G020012)
国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL078)
教育部人文社科研究项目(14YJC790119)
关键词
家族企业
逆向选择
信号传递
“泛家族”
family enterprise
adverse selection
signaling
＂quasi-family＂
