摘要
他心问题是当代心智哲学和认知科学均关注的一个重要议题。欧陆现象学家对交互主体性的反思为解决他心问题中的困难提供了丰富的现象学遗产。扎哈维和加拉格尔概括地重构了他心问题的"现象学主张",认为对他心的"体验式理解"是一种前反思的直接社会知觉,它无须借助反思性的理论推理与心智模拟来实现。因此,"现象学主张"质疑读心研究中的心智主义假设和普遍性假设,并对理解他心的诸分析进路的认识论谬误提出批判。在现象学自然化运动中发展起来的"神经现象学主张"则进一步提出理解他心的神经机制,即一种镜像神经元系统激活所启动的具身模拟。这将推进"现象学主张"对直接社会知觉在社会互动中首要地位的论证,并在神经科学与现象学的互惠约束中揭示出"笛卡尔式焦虑"是造成他心问题的认识论根源。
The ＂problem of other minds＂ and its？ derivative model of ＂mindreading＂ have become an important topic of central concern to philosophers of mind, psychologists and cognitive scientists. The problem of other minds can be described as follows： if the mind is a very private entity that can only be accessed by oneself, then how can I possibly understand the minds of other people？ How can I possibly share the world with others and how can people possibly share their own mental states with each other？ Epistemologically speaking, the research on the problem of other minds has followed a path formulated by the traditional Anglo-American analytic philosophy, and have realized its systematic integration and scientific confirmation with various knowledge of brain sciences. However, it is wQrth noting that this path has relatively neglected Continental philosophy＇s reflections upon the issue of intersubjectivity. Abundant phenomenological heritages have been found in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Stein, Gurwitseh, Scheler, and Schutz as they described and interpreting the ideas of other minds. Over the past decade or so, accompanied by the naturalization of phenomenology, many phenomenologists began to pay attention to the debates over those models of mindreading grounded in first-person and third-person perspectives, which indicated an absence of the experience of intersubjectivity from second-person perspective. These models of mindreading have two representatives, namely the Theory-Theory （TT） and Simulation Theory （ST） as well as various sub-versions and hybrids. Based on third-person perspective, TT states that our understanding and explaining of other minds are based on a folk psychological theory which consists of a framework of propositional attitudes. On the contrary, ST denies that we come to understand others through deployment of a theory. Instead, we adopt first-person perspective to understand other minds that we put ourselves in others＇ shoes to conscious
作者
陈巍
李恒威
Chen Wei Li Hengwei(Department of Psychology, Shaoxing University, Shaoxing 312000, China Department of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310028, China)
出处
《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期46-58,共13页
Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(16CZX015)
关键词
他心问题
神经现象学
直接社会知觉
镜像神经元
具身模拟
笛卡尔式焦虑
problem of other minds
neurophenomenology
direct social perception
mirror neurons
embodied simulation
Cartesian Anxiety
