To answer“what is wisdom?”,contemporary epistemologists have proposed various theories,one of which is Knowledge as Knowing How to Live Well(KLW).Stephen Grimm(2015)gives a recent version of KLW including three nece...To answer“what is wisdom?”,contemporary epistemologists have proposed various theories,one of which is Knowledge as Knowing How to Live Well(KLW).Stephen Grimm(2015)gives a recent version of KLW including three necessary conditions of wisdom.I criticize Grimm’s KLW in three aspects.Firstly,Grimm merely considers practical justifies beliefs and ignores theoretical justified beliefs.Secondly,Grimm’s claim“wisdom requires knowledge”is too strong to defend.Thirdly,knowing“a strategy for obtaining Goods”doesn’t entail following that strategy to obtain Goods.Respectively,I modify Grimm’s theory from three aspects:(Ⅰ)adding“a broad range of theoretical justified beliefs”in the definition of wisdom;(Ⅱ)replacing“knowledge”with“justified beliefs”;(Ⅲ)adding“a sincere tendency to act”in the definition of wisdom.The modified Grimm’s KLW provides more plausible necessary conditions of wisdom.Furthermore,conjunction of these necessary conditions can be regards as sufficient in a sense that the modified Grimm’s KLW provides a synthesis of other theories of wisdom.展开更多
My purpose in this paper is to argue for two separate, but related theses. The first is that contemporary analytic philosophy is incoherent. This is so, I argue, because its methods contain as an essential constituent...My purpose in this paper is to argue for two separate, but related theses. The first is that contemporary analytic philosophy is incoherent. This is so, I argue, because its methods contain as an essential constituent a non-classical conception of intuition that cannot be rendered consistent with a key tenet of analytic philosophy unless we allow a Bayesian-subjectivist epistemology. I argue for this within a discussion of two theories of intuition： a classical account as proposed by Descartes and a modem reliabilist account as proposed by Komblith, maintaining that reliabilist accounts require a commitment to Bayesian subjectivism about probability. However, and this is the second thesis, Bayesian subjecfivism is itself logically incoherent given three simple assumptions： （1） some empirical propositions are known, （2） any proposition that is known is assigned a degree of subjective credence of 1, and （3） every empirical proposition is evidentially relevant to at least one other proposition. I establish this using a formal reductio proof. I argue for the t-u-st thesis in section 1 and for the second in section 2. The final section contains a summary and conclusion.展开更多
Alvin Plantinga＇s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism （hereafter ＂EAAN＂） is an argument intended to prove that atheism is not highly probably true in the Darwinian framework. Many critics believe that this a...Alvin Plantinga＇s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism （hereafter ＂EAAN＂） is an argument intended to prove that atheism is not highly probably true in the Darwinian framework. Many critics believe that this argument Cannot work. I am one of them; but I have a different perspective. In my view, although EAAN was originally elaborated for defending theism, the failure of EAAN itself will not consequently undermine theism （as a religious position）, but will definitely undermine reliabilism （as an epistemological position）. My points include： （1） in Plantinga＇s epistemological reliabilist narrative, it is quite hard to clarify the meaning of the term ＂reliability＂ （as a key word of his whole narrative）, and it is the ambiguity of this term that makes some steps in Plantinga＇s argument more confusing than it ought to be; （2） conversely, if he wiped out this terminological ambiguity, the whole EAANnarrative based on ＂reliability＂ would have to be given up, and this cost may be too high for any EAANadherent to pay.展开更多
文摘To answer“what is wisdom?”,contemporary epistemologists have proposed various theories,one of which is Knowledge as Knowing How to Live Well(KLW).Stephen Grimm(2015)gives a recent version of KLW including three necessary conditions of wisdom.I criticize Grimm’s KLW in three aspects.Firstly,Grimm merely considers practical justifies beliefs and ignores theoretical justified beliefs.Secondly,Grimm’s claim“wisdom requires knowledge”is too strong to defend.Thirdly,knowing“a strategy for obtaining Goods”doesn’t entail following that strategy to obtain Goods.Respectively,I modify Grimm’s theory from three aspects:(Ⅰ)adding“a broad range of theoretical justified beliefs”in the definition of wisdom;(Ⅱ)replacing“knowledge”with“justified beliefs”;(Ⅲ)adding“a sincere tendency to act”in the definition of wisdom.The modified Grimm’s KLW provides more plausible necessary conditions of wisdom.Furthermore,conjunction of these necessary conditions can be regards as sufficient in a sense that the modified Grimm’s KLW provides a synthesis of other theories of wisdom.
文摘My purpose in this paper is to argue for two separate, but related theses. The first is that contemporary analytic philosophy is incoherent. This is so, I argue, because its methods contain as an essential constituent a non-classical conception of intuition that cannot be rendered consistent with a key tenet of analytic philosophy unless we allow a Bayesian-subjectivist epistemology. I argue for this within a discussion of two theories of intuition： a classical account as proposed by Descartes and a modem reliabilist account as proposed by Komblith, maintaining that reliabilist accounts require a commitment to Bayesian subjectivism about probability. However, and this is the second thesis, Bayesian subjecfivism is itself logically incoherent given three simple assumptions： （1） some empirical propositions are known, （2） any proposition that is known is assigned a degree of subjective credence of 1, and （3） every empirical proposition is evidentially relevant to at least one other proposition. I establish this using a formal reductio proof. I argue for the t-u-st thesis in section 1 and for the second in section 2. The final section contains a summary and conclusion.
文摘Alvin Plantinga＇s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism （hereafter ＂EAAN＂） is an argument intended to prove that atheism is not highly probably true in the Darwinian framework. Many critics believe that this argument Cannot work. I am one of them; but I have a different perspective. In my view, although EAAN was originally elaborated for defending theism, the failure of EAAN itself will not consequently undermine theism （as a religious position）, but will definitely undermine reliabilism （as an epistemological position）. My points include： （1） in Plantinga＇s epistemological reliabilist narrative, it is quite hard to clarify the meaning of the term ＂reliability＂ （as a key word of his whole narrative）, and it is the ambiguity of this term that makes some steps in Plantinga＇s argument more confusing than it ought to be; （2） conversely, if he wiped out this terminological ambiguity, the whole EAANnarrative based on ＂reliability＂ would have to be given up, and this cost may be too high for any EAANadherent to pay.
