摘要
当代知识论中,内在主义与外在主义一直被视为对立的两个范畴,事实上,它们确定两种认识上的不同进路和视角。一味强调它们的对立性,似乎无形中失去了实现两者后出现新趋势的可能。论文通过概念的扩展、可靠主义解释,以及认识实践进路的消解尝试,认为两者的表面对立中并非只有困境,更有融合的选择。
Internalism and Externalism in the contemporary epistemology （theory of knowledge） are taken as a pair of contrary categories, but they are just two types of different approaches and perspectives to knowledge. Should we emphasize much on their contrariness, there will lose possibility of the new tendency of integrating both sides. The paper, through expanding the relative concepts, explaining reliabilism and the epistemic practice holds that the ostensible contrary does not mean the mere predicament, but the choice of integration.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第3期14-18,共5页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
关键词
确证
内在主义
外在主义
可靠主义
justification
internalism
externalism
reliabilism
