摘要
一般认为认识的相对主义不属于严谨的理智判断。然而,这种有着认识相对性的立场表达同样有其基本的理由,并且不能否认其中存在相应的证据支持关系,即便这样的理由可能未必非常清晰、明确。传统的立场往往将这样的证据关系视为普遍先天可知,认识行动者无需付诸任何努力即可拥有,但这种理想主义的方案无益于理解证据关系的本质。而采用一种心理化的进路有助于做到这一点,这个进路主要是在可靠主义确证框架下用心理过程来锚定证据关系,以此进一步把握认识判断的相对性的根源所在,可以缓解对认识的相对主义的担忧。
Epistemic relativism is generally not thought to be rigorous intellectual judgment.However,the relativist epistemic status is still grounded on some basic reason,though it may not be clear and explicit enough,and the corresponding evidential support relations can not be denied.Traditional epistemologists mostly consider the evidential relations as innate knowable and agents can have it without having to make any efforts,but this ideal way does not help understand the nature of such relations.A psychologized approach would be more promising,which is to position the mental process as the anchor under the reliabilism frame so as to further comprehend the origins of relativity of epistemic judgment,and lessen the worry about epistemic relativism.
作者
方环非
FANG Huan-fei(School of Marxism,University of Shaoxing,Shaoxing 312000,China)
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
北大核心
2023年第7期40-46,共7页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
浙江省社科规划之江青年学者课题“涌现论马克思主义研究”(18ZJQN04YB)
2018年国家社会科学基金“应用知识论研究”(18BZX100)。
关键词
证据关系
相对性
可获得性
心理过程
可靠主义
evidential relations
relativity
availability
mental process
reliabilism
