从达标到排名:绩效考核模式转变何以扭转组织绩效?——基于行政数据归集工作的案例研究被引量：1

From Reaching the Standard to Ranking:How Can the Change of Appraisal Mode Reverse Organizational Performance?——A Case Study Based on Administrative Data Collection

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摘要达标考核和排名考核是政府治理实践中常用的两种绩效考核模式。本文基于行政数据归集案例发现:中央的绩效考核模式从达标考核转换为排名考核后,地方政府行政数据归集工作绩效出现了显著改善。进一步基于委托方-管理方-执行方的三级科层组织模型构建分析框架,对A省数据归集工作进行过程追踪和深描,揭示了纵向政府间绩效考核模式转变扭转组织绩效的机制:在达标考核中,管理方与执行方间的信息不对称使得管理方无法确定共同不确定因素是否影响了执行方的达标结果,导致达标考核的激励机制失效。而排名考核通过相对排名消除了共同不确定因素对排名结果的影响,使得执行方难以卸责。本质上,排名考核通过提供多个排名者的绩效信息减少了管理方与执行方间的信息不对称,使得考核结果更能反映执行方的个体努力水平。该结论有益于我们进一步理解政府组织中不同绩效考核模式的激励机制差异以及适用场景。 Reaching the standard and ranking are two frequently used performance appraisal modes in government governance practices.Based on the case of administrative data collection,this paper finds that the performance of local governments'administrative data collection has improved significantly after the appraisal mode changed from reaching the standard to ranking.In this paper,an analytical framework was constructed based on the three-level bureaucratic organizational model of"principal-manager-executor".Process-tracing methods and deep description were used in the case of administrative data collection in province A to reveal the mechanism by which the change of performance appraisal mode reversed organizational performance.When the appraisal mode is reaching the standard,the asymmetric information between managers and executors makes it difficult for the manager to identify whether the common uncertainties affect the assessment results of executors,which leads to the failure of the incentive mechanism.However,the ranking mode eliminates the influence of common uncertainties by giving multiple executors'relative ranking,making it difficult for the executors to shirk their responsibilities.In essence,the ranking mode reduces the information asymmetry between managers and executors by providing performance information of multiple executors,so that the ranking results can better reflect the individual efforts of executors.This conclusion is helpful for us to further understand the differences in incentive mechanisms and applicable scenarios of different performance appraisal modes in government organizations.

作者陈启博 Chen Qibo(School of Public Policy and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing,100084,China)

机构地区清华大学公共管理学院

出处《公共管理学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2024年第4期52-64,169,共14页 Journal of Public Management

关键词政府绩效考核排名考核达标考核信息不对称共同不确定因素 Government Performance Appraisal Ranking Reaching the Standard Information Asymmetry Common Uncertainties

分类号 D035 [政治法律—政治学]