摘要
防范和化解重大风险急需制度效力,而创新是增进制度有效供给的重要路径。从制度创新的理论视角出发,综合“结构—工具”与“文化—制度”视角,以深圳实践为个案,从基于历时性逻辑的制度实践、基于恰当性逻辑的制度结构以及基于适应性逻辑的制度环境等三个维度对地方应急管理制度创新的逻辑机理进行分析,发现条块结合和职责同构构成了影响我国地方政府应急管理制度创新的重要因素,地方政府根据中央统一安排、自身历史经验、现实问题困境进行判断与选择,形成自身的行为逻辑。在属地管理为主和中央统筹协调的基本原则下,深圳的制度创新实现了中央与地方在基层应急管理中的适度平衡,为地方政府应急管理制度创新的实践提供了重要启示。
Institutional efficacy is urgently needed to prevent and defuse major risks,while innovation is an important way to enhance the effectively supply of institutions.From the theoretical perspective of institutional innovation,integrating g"structure-instrument"and"culture-institution"perspectives,taking the practice of Shenzhen as a case,the study analyzes the logical mechanism of institutional innovation of local emergency management from three dimensions:institutional practice based on diachronic logic,institutional structure based on appropriative logic,and institutional environment based on adaptive logic.It is found that the combination of the compartmentalization of functional and local principles and the isomorphism of responsibilities are two key factors of influencing the innovation of local emergency management institutions in China.Local governments make judgments and choices according to the unified arrangement of the central government,their own historical experience and practical problem dilemma,and then form their own behavioral logic.Under the basic principles of territorial management and central coordination,the institutional innovation in Shenzhen has realized the appropriate balance between the central and local authorities in grass-roots emergency management,providing important inspiration for the practice of local government's emergency management system innovation.
作者
刘一弘
李静
LIU Yihong;LI Jing(School of Public Administration and Policy,Renmin University of China,Beijing,100872)
出处
《行政论坛》
北大核心
2023年第3期104-114,共11页
Administrative Tribune
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“重大突发事件触发政策优化的机理与路径分析”(72174201)
中国人民大学“智能时代中国特色超大城市治理创新研究”跨学科平台引导专项。
关键词
应急管理
制度创新
地方政府
emergency management
institutional innovation
local government
