摘要
在碳交易机制下,构建了制造业企业、政府、公众三方参与主体的演化博弈模型,并重点分析了政府、公众选择概率、碳交易成本、碳交易收益、政府规制成本和公众监督心理收益对演化稳定策略的影响.研究结果表明:(1)政府实施环境规制、公众进行监督有利于引导制造业企业进行碳减排;(2)政府实施环境规制、公众进行监督分别受环境规制成本、监督心理收益影响较大;(3)碳交易价格过低对引导制造业企业生产低碳产品不利,碳交易价格过高对政府实施环境规制不利.
Under the carbon trading mechanism,an evolutionary game model is constructed for the three participants of manufacturing enterprises,government and the public. And the influence of the probability of government and public choice,carbon trading cost,carbon trading income,government regulation cost and public supervision psychological benefit on the evolutionary stability strategy is mainly analyzed. The results show as follows:(1)The implementation of environmental regulations by the government and the supervision by the public are conducive to guiding the carbon emission reduction of manufacturing enterprises;(2)The implementation of environmental regulation by the government and the supervision by the public are greatly affected by the cost of environmental regulation and the psychological benefit of supervision;(3)Exceeding low carbon trading price is harmful for guiding manufacturing enterprises to produce low-carbon products,while exceeding high carbon trading price is not favorable for the government to implement environmental regulation.
作者
何嘉熙
庞庆华
HE Jiaxi;PANG Qinghua(Business School,Hohai University,Changzhou 213022,Jiangsu China)
出处
《河南科学》
2023年第2期283-291,共9页
Henan Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(22YJAZH086)。
关键词
碳交易机制
制造业企业
碳减排
演化博弈
carbon trading mechanism
manufacturing enterprise
carbon emission
evolutionary game
