摘要
2021年“交通灯”政府组阁后,德国联邦政府内否决玩家的数量增多、意识形态差距加大,相较于大联合政府,执政三党达成共识的难度增加,尤其是在三党政策定位差距较大的经济政策和气候环保领域,实施政策变革的难度更大。联邦议院中的反对党受到其议席数量的限制,对联邦政府提出的议案很难实施否决,但可通过相关法律程序就某项法案涉嫌违宪向联邦宪法法院提起诉讼,从而有可能阻断相关法案的通过。出于政党竞争的需要,联盟党会借助联邦参议院在立法过程中扮演否决玩家的角色,但其能否行使否决权受到共识政治下朝野共治的发展方向、联邦州的利益、选民的偏好、党内凝聚力等多种因素的影响。面对德国经济社会中的问题和挑战,如果“交通灯”政府政策变革速度过缓,无法满足选民诉求,执政党会因此失去选票,德国政治的稳定性将受到冲击。本文尝试从共识政治与否决玩家的理论视角出发,结合“交通灯”政府治下政治派别多元化增强的现实状况,探讨德国主要政党在联邦政府、联邦议院和联邦参议院进行合作与博弈的可能性,分析德国政治决策中共识与否决的变化趋势以及“后默克尔时代”德国政治的发展前景。
After Germany’s “traffic light coalition” took office in 2021, the increased number of veto players within the federal government and growing division of ideologies among the governing parties have made it much harder to reach consensus within the coalition compared with that of the Grand Coalition, especially concerning economic and climate policies,where great divergences exist as to the policy positioning of the three governing parties. A minority of seats of the opposition parties within the Bundestag means it is almost impossible for them to veto the bills proposed by the federal government, but it is possible for them to block the passage of some bills by resorting to the constitutional review procedures of the Constitutional Court. Driven by party competition, the CDU/CSU may play the role of a“veto-player” within the Bundesrat. However, whether it could succeed in vetoing a bill is determined by a series of factors such as the prospect of the consensus between the ruling and opposition parties, the interests of the states, the preferences of the voters and the degree of cohesion within the CDU/CSU itself. Confronted with a range of problems and challenges in the fields of economy and society, the stability of German politics will be threatened if the “traffic light coalition” could not promptly promote the policy reform process and satisfy the voters. Starting from the theoretical perspectives of consensus politics and veto players and in view of the reality of the intensified diversification of political fractions under the “traffic light government”, this paper attempts to explore the possibility of cooperation and game-playing between the main parties within the federal government, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat and analyzes the changing trend of consensus and veto within Germany’s decision-making mechanism and the prospects of Germany’s politics in the post-Merkel era.
出处
《欧洲研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第2期93-117,I0004,I0005,共27页
Chinese Journal of European Studies
