摘要
股权激励是解决委托代理问题的重要手段。股权激励在公司制度中应当起到这样的作用,即经理人通过持有股票,所持有的股票价值与公司未来发展相关联,将自身利益和公司利益相结合,从而使经理人更忠诚于公司,为公司的长远发展尽职尽责。那么,事实是否如此?企业能否做出正确有效的投资决策来提高投资效率在于企业的管理层自身素质的高低,及能否把个人利益和企业利益相统一,做出有效决策。鉴于此,上市企业的所有权人必须充分了解到委托代理双方的利益相关冲突,才能从公司全局出发、大局出发,制定出有利于上市公司发展的股权激励体系,保证投资决策的有效实施,进而提升企业无形和有形价值。所以,怎样切实有效的股权激励措施能够使管理层利益和企业利益在一定程度上相统一,促使高管做出正确投资决策,杜绝过度投资行为的发生?到目前为止,己有很多研究股权激励与企业绩效二者之间关系的理论成果,结论包括股权激励与企业绩效之间的利益趋同效应论、负效应论、无效应论和区间效应论,导致结论不一致的原因到底是什么?本研究通过在不同产权属性和不同激励方式下做出分析,探讨股权激励对提升中国上市公司长期盈利能力的效果,以及股权激励对上市公司企业投资行为的影响,进而实证检验中国上市公司股权激励对企业价值的影响。
Equity incentive is an important means to solve the principal-agent problem. Equity incentive should play such a role in the company system, that is, through holding shares, the value of the shares held by managers is related to the future development of the company, and combine their own interests with the interests of the company, so as to make managers more loyal to the company and fulfill their duties for the long-term development of the company. So, is this the case? Whether an enterprise can make correct and effective investment decisions to improve investment efficiency depends on the quality of the enterprise’s management, and whether it can unify personal interests and enterprise interests and make effective decisions. In view of this, the owners of listed enterprises must fully understand the interest related conflicts between the principal and agent, so as to formulate an equity incentive system conducive to the development of listed companies from the overall situation and the overall situation of the company, ensure the effective implementation of investment decisions, and then enhance the intangible and tangible value of the enterprise. Therefore, how can effective equity incentive measures unify the interests of management and enterprises to a certain extent, promote executives to make correct investment decisions and eliminate the occurrence of over investment? So far, there have been many theoretical results on the relationship between equity incentive and enterprise performance. The conclusions include interest convergence effect theory, negative effect theory, ineffective response theory and interval effect theory between equity incentive and enterprise performance. What are the reasons for the inconsistency of the conclusions? Through the analysis under different property rights attributes and different incentive methods, this study discusses the effect of equity incentive on improving the long-term profitability of Chinese listed companies and the impact of equity incentive on the investmen
作者
陶缘
TAO Yuan(Jiang Su Food&Pharmaceutical Science College,Huaian 223001,China)
出处
《上海管理科学》
2021年第6期45-49,共5页
Shanghai Management Science
关键词
股权激励
长期盈利能力
企业价值
equity incentive
long-term profitability
enterprise value
