摘要
以2011-2019年沪深A股国有上市公司为样本,实证检验国企高管持股、内部控制和过度投资之间的关系。研究结果表明,国企高管持股比例、内部控制质量均与过度投资显著负相关,两者交互作用于过度投资的关系体现为显著的替代效应。国企内部控制质量愈高,高管持股对过度投资的利益趋同效应则愈小,表明国企内控建设在偏重信息与沟通职能的同时弱化了内部监督职能。进一步研究发现:国企高管持股与内部控制分工抑制过度投资,且这种抑制作用在央企中表现得更为显著。
Using the data of Chinese A-share state-owned listed companies(SOEs)from 2011 to 2019,the paper empirically examines the relationship among executive ownership,internal control and overinvestment in SOEs.The empirical results suggest that the ratio of executive shareholding and the quality of internal control are both significantly negatively correlated with overinvestment,and their interaction in overinvestment is significantly reflected as substitution effect.The higher quality of the internal control in SOEs,the smaller benefit convergence effect of executive ownership on overinvestment,indicating that the construction of internal control emphasizes information and communication function,while weakens internal supervision function.Further studies reveal that division of labor between executives’shareholding and internal control occurred in their inhibition of overinvestment,and restraining effect was more significant in central enterprises.Based on the conclusions,this paper puts forward policy recommendations such as loosening the shareholding ratio of executives,improving internal control supervision functions,and reforming the promotion mechanism of state-owned enterprise executives.
作者
贺云龙
黄欣
HE Yun-long;HUANG Xin(Changsha University of Science&Technology,School of Economics and Managent,Changsha 410076,China)
出处
《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2021年第5期15-30,共16页
Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition
基金
黑龙江省哲学社会科学规划项目(19JYB032)。
关键词
国有企业
高管持股
内部控制
过度投资
state-owned enterprise
executive ownership
internal control
overinvestment
