摘要
利用随机前沿模型(SFM)定量测算我国上市公司的治理效率,并检验股权激励对上市公司治理效率的影响及作用机理。研究发现,我国上市公司的平均治理效率为74.7%-75.4%,并呈逐年下降趋势;股权激励与代理成本呈负相关的线性关系,表明提高股权激励水平能显著降低代理成本,提高公司治理效率;股权激励主要通过降低第一类代理成本来提高上市公司的治理效率,对第二类代理成本没有显著影响。
Based on the Stochastic Frontier Model (SFM), this paper quantitatively estimates the corporate governance efficiency, and the impact of equity incentives on the governance efficiency. Then, we reveal the mechanism of equity incentive on governance ef- ficiency by examining the equity incentive effect on two kinds of agency costs. The results show that, the average efficiency of the gov- ernance of listed companies is 74.7%~75.4%, and shows a declining trend. Equity incentive is negatively correlated to the agency cost, which means that improving the level of equity incentive can effectively reduce agency costs and improve the efficiency of corporate governance. Further test shows that, equity incentive improves the corporate governance efficiency mainly by reducing the agency cost I, but not the agency cost II.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期85-96,共12页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(16JJD790016)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71273112)