摘要
海洋牧场生态安全监管是由政府部门对海洋牧场企业的资源开发利用、环境治理保护等行为进行监督和管理,保证海洋牧场海域的资源与环境符合生态安全需要,其对实现海洋牧场的环境保护、资源养护和渔业持续产出功能具有重要作用。首先分析了海洋牧场生态安全监管中的参与主体为政府部门和海洋牧场企业,然后从监管与不监管、重视与不重视两个维度构建了海洋牧场生态安全监管博弈参与主体的策略集合及收益矩阵,在此基础上结合复制动态方程和雅可比矩阵求解了海洋牧场生态安全监管博弈中演化稳定策略并进行了稳定性分析和模拟仿真,最后提出了海洋牧场生态安全监管的对策建议。研究结果表明,对海洋牧场企业不重视生态安全行为的惩罚力度、政府部门从发现企业不重视生态安全中获取的收益、外界监督力量监督成功的概率是影响演化博弈结果的重要因素。据此提出"加大对海洋牧场企业不重视海洋牧场生态安全行为的处罚力度、提高政府部门发现海洋牧场企业不重视海洋牧场生态安全时的收益、建立健全海洋牧场生态安全监管机制、发挥外界监督力量的作用"等政策建议,以维护我国海洋牧场生态安全。
The supervision on ecological security of marine ranching(MRESS) refers to the supervision and management for the behavior of marine ranching enterprises(e.g., development and utilization of resources, governance and protection of environment, etc.) by government departments to ensure that the resources and environment in the areas of marine ranching meet the needs of ecological security. The MRESS has great influences on realizing the functions of marine ranching such as environmental protection, resource conservation, and fisheries′ sustainable production. Firstly, the participants involved in the game of MRESS are analyzed to be government departments and marine ranching enterprises, and then their strategy sets within a revenue matrix are introduced from two dimensions of "making supervision or not" and "paying attention or not". The evolutionarily stable strategies in the game of MRESS are solved by employing duplicate dynamic equations and jacobian matrices, based on which the stability analysis and simulation of solutions are both implemented and the suggestions for MRESS are also presented. The results reveal that the critical influence factors in the game of MRESS include the penalties to marine ranching enterprises which are careless to ecological security, the revenues of government departments on the MRESS, and the probabilities of successful surveillance by the external supervision forces. Accordingly, the MRESS suggestions are proposed to help protect the ecological security of marine ranching, e.g., strengthening penalties for those careless marine ranching enterprises, increasing the revenues of government departments, constructing and improving the mechanism for MRESS, performing the external supervision forces′ duties.
作者
杜元伟
孙浩然
王一凡
万骁乐
DU Yuanwei;SUN Haoran;WANG Yifan;WAN Xiaole(Management College,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China)
出处
《生态学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第12期4795-4805,共11页
Acta Ecologica Sinica
基金
国家社科基金重大项目(18ZDA055)。
关键词
海洋牧场
生态安全
监管行为
演化博弈
仿真
marine ranching
ecological security
supervision
evolutionary game
simulation
