摘要
本文将制度的人为设计理念融入"制度创新—制度选择—制度扩散"的一般性制度演化分析中,并基于中国特色制度变迁的情境,构建了多层次多主体参与的"设计—演化"制度变迁分析框架,对新中国成立以来农地制度变迁逻辑进行研究。研究表明,新中国成立后农地制度变迁逻辑表现为中央政府、地方政府、村集体与农户间基于制度设计与演化的有机互动。整体上符合制度"创新—选择—扩散"的演化机制,人为设计内嵌于制度创新、制度选择和制度扩散三个环节,但是农地制度改革不同阶段人为设计的介入程度呈现显著的差异性:土地改革阶段表现为"设计—演化"的有效互动,中央政府通过主动选择和扩散制度满足了源自村集体及农户的土地改革需求,促进了新中国成立后农业生产的迅速恢复;农业合作化阶段的农地制度演变主要体现为在中央政府宏观"设计"行为下地方及村集体在制度创新和选择行为方面做出的有限调整,导致了集体化的失败;而中央政府对地方基层创新行为的认可或否定,构成了家庭联产承包责任制建立、补充和完善阶段的主要内容。从"两权分离"到"三权分置"的确立,进一步推动了"中国奇迹"的诞生。基于此,在未来农地和其他农村集体土地制度改革中,应该在坚持改革底线基础上,放宽对于集体的行政约束,鼓励引导地方政府和村集体进行自主创新和自主选择,同时加强中央与地方之间的互动与交流,通过审慎严谨的制度推广以降低其他地区制度创新的交易费用。
Based on the situation of institutional changes with Chinese characteristics,this paper integrates the artificial design concept of the institution into the general institutional evolution analysis of"institution innovation-institution choiceinstitution diffusion",and constructs the theoretical framework of institutional change from the perspective of multi-level and multi-Agent and interaction of design and evolution to analyze the logic of farmland tenure change.The research shows that the logic of the change of the agricultural land institution after the founding of the People’s Republic of China is an organic interaction between the central government,local governments,village collectives and farmers based on institutional design and evolution,which is in overall conformity with the evolution mechanism of the institution’s"innovation-selection-diffusion".It is embedded in the three links of institutional innovation,institutional selection and institutional diffusion,but the degree of intervention of human design in different stages of farmland institution reform is significantly different:the land reform stage is represented by the effective interaction of"design-evolution".The selection and diffusion institution meets the land reform needs of village collectives and farmers,and promotes the rapid recovery of agricultural production after the founding of the country;the evolution of the agricultural land institution in the stage of agricultural cooperation is mainly reflected in the local government’s macro-design activities.The limited adjustments made by the village collective in terms of institutional innovation and choice behavior have led to the failure of collectivization;while the central government’s approval or denial of local grassroots innovation behavior constitutes the stage of establishment,supplementation and improvement of the household contract responsibility institution main content.The establishment of"separation of two powers"and"separation of three powers"further promoted the birt
作者
吴一恒
曲福田
马贤磊
WU Yiheng;QU Futian;MA Xianlei(Nanjing Agriculture University,210095)
出处
《制度经济学研究》
2021年第1期-,共25页
Research on Institutional Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“村庄治理视角下农地产权状态、农地流转契约结构与农业经营绩效:影响机制与政策设计”(编号:71773054)
国家重点研发计划重点专项项目“粮食与食品双安全战略下的自然资源持续利用与环境治理”(编号:2016YFE0103100)
清华大学中国农村研究院博士论文奖学金项目“农地‘三权分置’制度下的产权配置研究”(编号:201807)
关键词
农地制度
制度变迁
制度设计
制度演化
Farmland Institution
Institutional Change
Institutional Design
Institutional Evolution
