摘要
国有企业资产监管涉及经济系统下不同行为主体间的利益掣肘及其策略选择问题。基于系统论视阈,文章构建了"国资委-国企集团母公司-海外子公司"的子系统互动模型,进行了静态纳什均衡及动态序贯博弈分析,研究揭示:(1)系统论视阈下国资委应当提供顶层防范型激励机制;(2)短期内,国资委在政策上加大对国企母公司的奖惩可有效防范境外国有资产流失,而一味加大对子公司惩罚的力度无助于约束资产流失;(3)长期看,国资委需要对母子公司均配有一定程度的威慑惩罚措施。研究结论对系统论视阈下如何减少国有资产流失、实现国企母子公司管理协同具有启示意义。
Monitoring and preventing state-owned assets losses is a problem of mutual influence of interests and strategic choice among different actors in the economic system. Based on a systematic perspective,the article constructs a subsystem interaction model among "SASAC-Parent company of state-owned enterprise-Overseas subsidiary". Through the analysis of static Nash equilibrium and dynamic sequential game under the interaction of multiple elements of the system,the results reveals that:( 1) Based on a systematic perspective,the SASAC should provide a top-level design;( 2) In the short term,performance-based incentives by SASAC group on parent companies will enhance management effectiveness,while the aggravated punishment by SASAC on subsidiary enterprises rather than parent enterprises is invalid;( 3) In the long term,for both parent and subsidiary enterprises,SASAC must carry out a certain degree of punishment. The conclusion is of great significance for the SASAC to effectively reduce the loss of overseas assets and to achieve management synergy from a systematic perspective.
作者
马喜芳
浦再明
熊竞
MA Xi-fang;PU Zai-ming;XIONG Jing(National Institute of Strategic Studies,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200030,China;Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200030,China;China Institute for Urban Governance,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200030,China)
出处
《系统科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期40-45,共6页
Chinese Journal of Systems Science
基金
国家社会科学基金(19BGL115)。
关键词
系统论视阈
系统要素与互动
国企集团母子公司
博弈均衡
防范型激励机制
systematic perspective
systematic elements and interaction
parent-subsidiary of state-owned enterprise group
game equilibrium
preventive incentive mechanism
