摘要
合作研发的企业分为两种类型:互惠主义者和机会主义者,并运用演化博弈理论对企业间合作研发过程中的机会主义行为进行演化分析.分析表明:若企业能够彼此识别,则机会主义行为将灭绝;若企业不能彼此识别,机会主义行为将泛滥市场.同时还研究了监督机制对防范机会主义行为的有效性.
This paper studies the evolution of opportunistic behavior in a cooperative R＆D market consisting of two types of enterprises： opportunists and reciprocators. The results show that if the enterprises can identify each other, the opportunistic behavior will be extinct. If the enterprise cannot identify each other, the opportunist will prevail. And the validity of monitor mechanism guarding against opportunistic behavior is also studied.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第4期80-87,共8页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70301014)
经济转型与发展创新基地资助项目.
关键词
合作研发
机会主义行为
演化博弈
cooperative R＆D
opportunistic behavior
evolutionary game
