摘要
为了从激励角度探究高管腐败的治理机制,本文以2009年《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》的发布为外生事件构建准自然实验,综合采用双重差分法与中介效应分析法,实证检验业绩考核制度的变化对高管隐性腐败行为产生的影响。研究结果表明,该办法实施后,中央企业高管的隐性腐败显著减少,并且这一作用机制是通过提高薪酬契约的激励效率来实现的。进一步研究发现,该办法抑制高管隐性腐败主要是降低激励过度诱致的腐败,而对于激励不足导致的腐败却作用甚微;该办法抑制高管腐败的作用主要发生在产权保护与法律执行力度强的地区,在产权保护与法律执行力度弱的地区其作用效果并不显著。因此,在反腐败过程中,除了“将权力关进制度的笼子里”,建立恰当的激励机制同样重要,而激励效率的提升离不开制度环境的协同,这对于全面认识腐败治理机制与深入推进“不能腐、不敢腐、不想腐”机制建设具有一定的参考价值。
In order to explore the governance mechanism of executive corruption from the perspective of incentives,based on the insurance of"Interim measures for the assessment of management performance of Heads of Central enterprises"in 2009 and combination of both the difference in difference method and the intermediary effect model,this paper empirically tests the impact of the changes in the performance assessment system in Central enterprises on the intangible corruption of senior executives.The results show that the intangible corruption of the executives has been significantly reduced after the implementation of this system,and this mechanism is realized by improving the incentive efficiency of the compensation contract;further,this mechanism more lies in reducing excessive incentive than in insufficient incentive.It mainly occurs in areas with strong property protection and law enforcement,and has no significant effect in areas with weak property protection and law enforcement.In addition to"putting power in the cage of the system",it is equally important to establish an appropriate incentive mechanism in the process of anti-corruption,and the incentive efficiency partly depends on the coordination of the institutional environment.All of these findings have certain reference value for comprehensively understanding the corruption governance mechanism and further promoting the"three-non-corrupting"mechanism.
作者
池国华
朱俊卿
CHI Guohua;ZHU Junqing(Institute of Audit Science,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China;School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)
出处
《中南财经政法大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期3-16,158,共15页
Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目“政府审计与内部控制整合视角下的腐败综合治理机制研究:基于政府和企业两种情境”(71772089)
南京审计大学预研资金项目“基于银企内部控制视角的信贷市场风险防范与化解研究”(18ZDYY002)
江苏高校“青蓝工程”资助计划(2018)。
关键词
EVA考核
隐性腐败
薪酬契约
激励不足
激励过度
EVA Assessment
Executive Intangible Corruption
Compensation Contract
Insufficient Incentive
Excessive Incentive
