摘要
全要素生产率是反映资源配置效率与质量的重要指标,特别是在"双循环"的背景下,对于国民经济发展具有重要影响的央企如何提高其全要素生产率是政府部门及学界关注的重要问题。业绩考核制度对于央企高管决策具有导向性影响,通过准自然实验的方法,检验了业绩考核制度与央企全要素生产率的关系,并发现业绩考核制度有利于改善企业全要素生产率。机制检验结果表明,其中潜在的作用路径为提高央企信息透明度和创新水平。进一步研究发现,在不同的作用环境中,业绩考核制度与央企全要素生产率的关系存在差异,即这一促进作用更多地反映在法制环境较好、市场竞争更充分的环境中。研究结论不仅丰富了全要素生产率影响因素的相关文献,而且为国资监管部门制定相关政策提供了参考。
Total factor productivity is an important indicator reflecting the efficiency an dquality of resource allocation,especially in the context of“double circulation”,how toimpr ove the total factor productivity of central enterprises which have an important impacton the development of national economy is an important issue concerned by governmentdepartments and academia.The performance appraisal system has a guiding influe nce on t he decision-making of the executives of central enterprises.Through the quasinatura lexperiment m ethod,this paper tests the relationship between the performanceappraisal systemand the total factor productivity of central enterprises,and finds that the performance appraisal system is conducive to improving the total factor productivity of enterprises.Themechanism test results show that the potential path is to restrain the agency cost of central enterprise executives and the trend of enterprise financiali zation.Further research shows that the relationship between performance appraisalsyste m and total factor productivity of central enterprises is different in different enviro nments,that is to say,the promotion effect is more reflected in the environment of betterle gal environment and more sufficient market competition.The conclusion not only enrichesthe relevant literature on the influencing factors of TFP,but also provides a reference for the state-owned assets regulatory authorities to formulate relevant policies.
作者
王靖宇
张宏亮
陈海涛
Jingyu Wang;Hongliang Zhang;Haitao Chen(School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics;Business School,Beijing Technology and Business University;School of Economics,Central University of Finance and Economics)
出处
《经济学报》
CSSCI
2021年第4期1-26,共26页
China Journal of Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“注册制下机构投资者促进企业持续创新的模式、机制及制度设计”(21BGL098)
教育部人文社科规划基金项目“高管激励结构、风险承担与企业创新研究”(20YJA630089)
北京市社会科学基金重点项目“创新与风险承担视角下高管激励结构的测度、效应及设计”(19GLA007)的资助。
