摘要
本文利用2010年中央企业开始全面实施EVA业绩评价这一自然事件,检验了业绩评价改变是否会影响企业风险承担。研究发现,实施EVA业绩评价制度后,中央企业改变了风险承担水平;当管理者拥有较低权力、较高能力以及较多薪酬激励时,实施EVA业绩评价制度后中央企业会更积极去承担风险。进一步研究发现,EVA业绩评价制度显著增加了中央企业价值。本文研究不仅丰富了企业风险承担研究内容,而且对于完善业绩评价制度和提高企业风险承担水平提供了参考。
Using a natural event that the central enterprises began to fully implement the EVA performance evaluation in 2010, this paper tests whether the change in performance evaluation will affect the enterprise risk. The study found that the central enterprises change the risk-taking level after the implementation of EVA performance evaluation system; when managers have low power, high ability and more incentive motivation, the central enterprises will be more actively to take a risk after EVA performance evaluation system. Further study indicates that EVA performance evaluation system significantly increased corporate value of central enterprises. This study not only enriches the enterprise risk-taking theory, but also provides a reference to improve the performance evaluation system and corporate risk-taking level.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第6期99-116,共18页
China Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71102168、71572195)
教育部新世纪优秀人才项目(NCET-13-1042)
关键词
业绩评价
企业风险承担
经济增加值
Performance Evaluation
CorporateRisk-Taking
Economic Value Added
