摘要
外部资本投入不足是制约乡村旅游发展、限制旅游扶贫效果的关键因素,发挥政府作用推动资本落地是实现乡村社会经济发展的重要保障。从实践出发,文章将我国乡村旅游投资决策过程中的地方政府划分为主导型和辅助型两种类型,通过构建政府和投资企业之间的不完全信息动态博弈模型,对政府在推动乡村旅游投资中的作用进行理论推导。以W村为案例的模型实证检验结果表明:在乡村旅游发展初始阶段,拟投资企业对政府开发信念的认知是其制定投资决策的关键,而地方政府的先期投资建设和主导行为在很大程度上影响着投资企业对政府开发信念的判断。具体地,地方政府向投资企业传递的支持信息越多,投资企业在经济利益的驱使下参与乡村旅游项目投资的意愿越高。研究认为,不完全信息动态博弈模型对中国乡村旅游投资中的政府作用和行为具有很好的解释性,大多数中国乡村旅游开发难以得到外部资本市场青睐的主要原因不在于外部资本总量不足或资本市场不活跃,而在于地方政府在招商引资阶段传递出的主导性信息不够。
Lack of external capital input is the key factor that restricts the development of rural tourism and the effect of poverty alleviation.Government’s role in promoting the landing of capital is an important guarantee for the realization of rural social and economic development.From the practiceperspective,this paper sorted local governments as dominant and auxiliary types according to the role they play in the investment and decision-making processes of rural tourism,constructed a dynamic game model of incomplete information between the government and investment enterprises,theoretically deduced the role of the government in promoting rural tourism investment,and tested the model by taking W village as the case in point.The results show that the cognition of local governments’willingness to develop enterprises is the key to their investment decision-making at the primary stage of rural tourism development.In addition,the early investment construction and leading behavior of the government affect the enterprises’judgment of government’s development belief to a great extent.Specifically,the more support information the local government sends to the enterprises,the higher the willingness of the investors isin participating in the investment of rural tourism projects driven by economic benefits.It is also found that the dynamic game model with incomplete information has a good explanation for the role and behavior of the government in China’s rural tourism investment,and that the main reason why China’s rural tourism development is difficult to be favored by the external capital market is not that the total amount of external capital is insufficient or the capital market is not active,but that local governments do not transmit enough leading information at investment attraction stage.
作者
马晓龙
陈泠静
尹平
李维维
MA Xiaolong;CHEN Lingjing;YIN Ping;LI Weiwei(College of Tourism and Service Management,Nankai University,Tianjin 300350,China;School of Tourism and Geography Science,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China)
出处
《旅游科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期19-31,共13页
Tourism Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“城市旅游综合体的时空演化机制及其对区域旅游格局的影响研究”(41471131)
南开大学百名青年学科带头人项目资助(9192311)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(63192810)
青岛市“双百调研工程”2019年度调研课题“青岛海岛与海岸带旅游联合发展模式及对策研究”(2019-B-01)
关键词
政府作用
乡村旅游投资
不完全信息动态博弈
government role
rural tourism investment
dynamic game with incomplete information
