摘要
分析区块链信息服务监管中参与主体的决策行为,有助于寻找区块链创新与监管间的平衡点。基于有限理性演化博弈理论,建立区块链信息服务监管三方演化博弈模型;通过对政府部门、信息服务提供者与使用者博弈策略演化稳定性的分析,并置入计算实验方法"情景--应对"思想进行数值模拟与仿真计算。实验结果表明,在政府部门严格监管情景下,通过"命令--控制"机制以规避信息服务违规风险,往往会因为程度难以把控而阻碍区块链创新发展,而建立信息服务供求双方"损失--赔偿"动态调试性监管规制,能提升信息服务的使用效率。
The analysis of the decision-making behavior of participants in the supervision of block chain information service helps to find the balance between block chain innovation and supervision.Based on the evolutionary game theory of finite rationality,a tripartite evolutionary game model of block chain information service supervision is established.By analyzing the evolutionary stability of game strategies of government departments,information service providers and users,and incorporating the idea of"scenario-response"into the calculation experiment method,numerical simulation and simulation calculation are carried out.Experimental results show that:in government regulation scenario,"command–control"mechanism is adopted to avoid the risk of illegal information service;due to the difficulty of controlling the degree,the block chain innovation and development is hindered,while establishing the"losses–compensation"dynamic debugging supervision regulation for information service providers and users can improve the use efficiency of the information service.
作者
刘骅
王璨
Liu Hua;Wang Can(School of Finance,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China;Jiangsu Branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,Nanjing 210006,China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期175-183,共9页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
江苏省“六大人才高峰”高层次人才项目“江苏省物联网产业项目运营绩效审计研究”(XYDXXJS-036)
南京市科技发展计划项目(软科学研究)“‘互联网+’背景下科技型中小企业融资风险及审计预警研究”(201809039)
关键词
区块链
信息服务
演化博弈
系统仿真
计算实验
block chain
information services
evolutionary game
system simulation
computational experiments
