摘要
区块链的政务数据共享可在确保数据安全的前提下打通各部门间数据壁垒,对进一步提升政府治理能力和公共服务水平具有重要意义。为探究奖惩视域下多方利益主体在政务数据共享中的行为倾向,本文首先构建了政府部门、区块链服务商和第三方监管机构的演化博弈模型,其次通过模型稳定性分析探究了三方演化博弈的均衡条件,接着借助MATLAB对演化博弈结果进行仿真分析与验证,最后为推动区块链政务数据共享提出有针对性的建议。研究发现,政府部门、区块链服务商和第三方监管机构是区块链政务数据共享中不可或缺的重要参与者。其中,第三方监管机构对于促进区块链政务数据共享具有重要意义。合理的奖惩机制是区块链政务数据共享中的关键一环,适当的惩罚能够促使区块链服务商提供更安全的服务;适当的奖励可以激励监管机构严格监管区块链服务商的运营环境。本文为进一步推动区块链政务数据共享提供了具体可操作的建议。
Blockchain-based government data sharing may break through data barriers between various departments on the premise of ensuring data security,providing an important guarantee for the interconnection and interoperability of government affairs information among various departments and further improving government governance capabilities and public service levels.However,since blockchain technology is highly professional,it is challenging for the government departments to accurately monitor the security of government data on the chain.As a result,the blockchain regulatory sandbox has emerged and has piloted applications worldwide.Unlike the previous situation where the supervision function is directly assigned to the government department,the blockchain supervision sandbox features a further subdivided supervision function.That is,the government department is responsible for policy formulation and report release,and the blockchain technology supervision is carried out by a third party.This design fully considers the professionalism of blockchain technology and is more in line with the actual need and reality.Therefore,on the basis of evolutionary game theory,we analyse the tripartite game between government departments,blockchain service providers and third-party regulators from the perspective of a reward and punishment mechanism,and put forward suggestions for the further promotion of blockchain-based government data sharing.Regarding the irreplaceable role of third-party regulators in the professional supervision of blockchain-based government data sharing,we firstly introduce the subject of third-party regulators on the basis of government departments and blockchain service providers,and construct an evolutionary game model between government departments,blockchain service providers and third-party regulators.We then set“positive promotion”and“negative promotion”as optional strategies of government departments;“positive upgrade of security services”and“negative upgrade of security services”as opt
作者
韩普
顾亮
叶东宇
李娜
HAN Pu;GU Liang;YE Dongyu;LI Na(School of Management,Nanjing University of Posts&Telecommunications,Nanjing 210003,China;Jiangsu Provincial Key Laboratory of Data Engineering and Knowledge Service,Nanjing 210023,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第4期122-132,共11页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(17CTQ022)
江苏省研究生科研创新计划项目(KYCX21_0844)。
关键词
区块链
政务数据共享
奖惩机制
三方演化博弈
Blockchain
Government data sharing
Reward and punishment mechanism
Tripartite evolutionary game
