摘要
共享汽车因在其投放市场大多可享受政府补贴,在信息不对称的情况下,企业可能存在欺骗政府行为。在一定假设基础上,构建动态博弈模型对政府补贴与企业行为进行讨论,得出了企业欺骗倾向只与检查成本和处罚力度有关,与企业自身成本与市场收益无关,根据结论对共享汽车市场健康发展提出了建议。
In the market for car sharing company mostly can enjoy government subsidies,in the case of asymmetric information,firms are likely to cheat the government.On the basis of assumptions,this paper constructs a dynamic game model of discussion on the government subsidies and enterprise behavior.According to the conclusion the enterprise cheat inclination only relates to cost of government supervision and punishment,unconcerned to their cost and the market return.Finally,according to the conclusion,we make some suggestions about the healthy development of the car-sharing market.
作者
周杨
周昭雄
ZHOU Yang;ZHOU Zhao-xiong(University of Shanghai for Science and Technology Management College,Shanghai 200093,China)
出处
《中国林业经济》
2018年第1期124-126,共3页
China Forestry Economics
关键词
共享汽车
政府补贴
欺骗倾向
动态博弈
car-sharing
government subsidy
cheat inclination
dynamic game
