摘要
通过构建政府和能源产业、新能源产业和传统能源产业两个演化博弈模型,研究政府是否应参与能源结构调整问题,探讨在政府参与下新能源产业和传统能源产业的合作竞争发展关系,结果表明,政府参与能源结构调整和发展新能源产业是最优均衡策略选择。其中,社会福利水平、能源结构调整对社会福利影响系数、政府的税收和补贴、传统能源和新能源产业的盈利水平都是影响演化均衡的重要影响因素,政府补贴对演化均衡的影响存在不确定性;在政府参与下新能源产业和传统能源产业均选择合作策略是最优均衡策略,政府的税收和补贴、合作竞争的不同策略所导致的盈利和损失影响着演化均衡的达成。
This paper studies the government＇s decision-making in the process of energy structure adjustment. Firstly,two evolutionary game models are presented among the government,energy industry,new energy industry and traditional energy industry in order to answer the question whether the government should participate in the energy structure adjustment. Secondly,the cooperative and competitive relation between the new energy industry and the traditional energy industry is analyzed. The results show that government＇s participation in energy structure adjustment and the development of new energy industry are the optimal equilibrium strategies.The level of social welfare,the coefficient of the adjustment of energy structure to social welfare,the government positive effect,government tax and subsidy,traditional energy and new energy industry profitability are the important factors to equilibrium. However,the impact of government subsidies on the evolution equilibrium is uncertainty. When the government involves,the new energy industry and the traditional energy industry choose the cooperation strategy. The taxes and subsidies,the profit and loss caused by different cooperative strategies play an important role on the evolutionary equilibrium.
出处
《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第1期145-156,共12页
Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science
基金
国家社科基金重大项目(15ZDB171)
国家自然科学基金(71373147)
泰山学者工程专项经费资助项目(tsqn20161014)
关键词
能源结构调整
能源产业
新能源
传统能源
energy structure adjustment
energy industry
new energy
traditional energy
