摘要
【目的/意义】个人求助网络募捐模式下网络舆情演变各阶段参与主体的认知和利益诉求的差异会影响其行为策略选择,利用演化博弈理论可以从根本上分析舆情的形成与演化动因。【方法/过程】以罗尔事件为例,在动态演化博弈模型基础上探究网络舆情形成、发展、控制三阶段多方参与主体的演化稳定策略选择,并对网络舆情的演变提出合理的指导意见。【结果/结论】根据博弈结果可知:受助人联合企业发布虚假求助信息、网民采取捐助是网络舆情形成阶段的演化稳定策略;事件内情的曝光,网民总体倾向质疑使网络舆情进一步发酵,此时政府的有效干预与相关责任方合理解释有利于控制舆情的波动,使公众利益得到补偿,从而缓解舆情的负面影响。
【Purpose/significance】The choice of behavior strategy will be affected by participants＇ cognition and interests differences in every network public opinion evolution stage under the mode of individual help for online donation.The formation and evolution causes of public opinion can be fundamentally explored through the evolutionary game theory method.【Method/process】The rolle events is given as an example, participants＇ evolutionary stable strategies in the three phases such as formation, development and control of network public opinion is explored by dynamic evolution game model, respectively, the corresponding guidance of network public opinion evolution is put forward by combining with the case.【Result/conclusion】According to the results of the game, we can see that the joint venture recipients＇ activities of issuing false information for help, as well as the donation by the Internet users are the evolutionary strategy for the formation of the network public opinion. The exposure of the incident,and the overall tendency of the Internet users＇ oppugn will further enrich the public opinion,which can be controlled by the government＇s effective intervention and relevant responsible party＇s reasonable explanation,and the public interest gets compensation,resultly the negative impact of public opinion can be alleviated.
作者
张琳
杨尊琦
ZHANG Lin YANG Zun-qi(Department of Management Information System, Tianjin University of Finance and Economic, Tianjin 300222, Chin)
出处
《情报科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第10期79-87,166,共10页
Information Science
关键词
个人求助
网络募捐
演化博弈
演化稳定策略
individual help
online donation
evolutionary game
evolutionary stable strategy
