摘要
[目的/意义]本文以公共工程网络舆情为研究对象,在政府与利益相关网民的演化博弈模型基础上,考虑到参与方的非理性情绪化因素对其决策行为产生的影响,创新性地引入情绪函数结合秩依期望效用理论(简称RDEU)构建了公共网络舆情的RDEU演化博弈模型,并通过仿真分析模拟了网民的不同情绪对演化状态的影响,对模型的有效性进行了验证。文章给出了公共网络舆情的定义,在考虑到与网民利益的直接相关性的前提下得出了研究结论:参与双方至少有一方保持理性时博弈才能达到某一稳态;乐观情绪对缓解舆情有积极作用,而悲观情绪会使其恶化,但网民越悲观,政府的处理措施效果越显著;揭示了公共舆情中“小闹小得,大闹大得,不闹不得”的公众心理。最终文章基于上述研究成果,以提高政府正确引导公众情绪并解决公共网络舆情的能力为目的提出了相应的政策建议。
This paper takes the network public opinion in public projects as the research object.Considering the influence of the irrational and emotional factors of the participants on their decision-making behavior and based on the evolutionary game model of the government and interested netizens,this paper innovatively introduces the emotional function combined with the rank-dependented utility theory,to construct the RDEU evolutionary game model of the network public opinion in public projects,and simulates the influence of different emotions on the evolution state of the netizens through simulation analysis,and verifies the validity of the model.The article gives the definition of network public opinion in public projects.Under the premise of fully considering the direct correlation with the interests of netizens,the conclusion is drawn:the game can reach a certain steady state when at least one party maintains rationality;Relieving sensation has a positive effect,and pessimism will make it worse,but the more pessimistic the netizens,the more effective the government's treatment measures;revealing the public psychology of“the more protests,the more you get”in public opinion in public projects.Based on the above research results,the final article puts forward corresponding policy recommendations for the purpose of improving the government's ability to correctly guide public sentiment and solve public projects network grievances.
作者
郭松
GUO Song(Logistics Service Group,Jilin University,Changchun 130012,China)
出处
《情报科学》
北大核心
2023年第12期33-40,共8页
Information Science
关键词
公共舆情
舆情治理
情绪因素
秩依期望效用理论
演化博弈
public projects
deal with network public opinion
emotional factor
the rank-dependented utility theory
evolutionary game
