摘要
为满足消费者食品安全需求,防范食品安全风险,中国从2000年逐步推行可追溯体系,企业参与溯源信息共享的意愿决定了可追溯体系的推广程度。因此,构建了食品生产商和食品加工商的演化博弈模型,分析了二者在溯源信息共享中的稳定策略,并利用数值仿真演示了不同参数下模型的演化路径。结果表明:共享溯源信息的投入产出比,共享溯源信息所减少的损失值和"搭便车"收益的大小影响演化结果。最后,结合本研究的研究结论,为可追溯体系的发展提供相关建议。
In order to meet consumers＂ demand for safer food and avoid food safety incidents, government departments have already implemented food traceability system in different cities since 2000. And whether the promotion of traceability system is successful or not inherently depends on the food enterprises＂ willingness to share traceable information. Therefore, the paper was composed to build the model of manufacturers and pro- cessors on the evolutionary game. This paper explored the evolutionary stable strategies in traceable information sharing and the evolutionary equilibrium with respect to different parameters between manufacturers and pro- cessors. The result illustrated that the traceable information sharing of both manufacturers and processors are related to the ratios of input-output. The loss of information sharing and the reward of ＂free rider＂ behavior had also a certain impact on evolutionary game result respectively. Lastly, on the basis of the above analysis, the paper proposed some associative suggestion for the development of the food traceability system.
作者
宋焕
王瑞梅
胡妤
SONG Huan WANG Rui-mei HU Yu(College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China)
出处
《哈尔滨工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2017年第2期111-118,共8页
Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家科技支撑计划项目"村镇服务业协同发展关键技术研究"(2014BAL07B05)
教育部人文社科项目"食品可追溯体系中参与主体的行为特征及其影响因素研究"(13YJCZH182)
关键词
食品供应链
信息共享
可追溯体系
food supply chain
information sharing
food traceability system
