摘要
近年来,政策性信访问题逐步凸显,约占全部信访量的六成以上。为妥善处理政策性信访问题,通过构建政府部门和信访群体的演化博弈模型,研究博弈双方的策略选择、动态博弈过程及演化稳定策略。结论认为:任意一方的策略选择受对方影响,政府应该根据信访群体的行为不断调整策略;调整参数,可以影响博弈策略组合,并使策略组合朝着理想区域转化。最后,提出降低群众信访成本、维护信访纪律、规范信访事项办理、严肃信访工作问责等工作改进建议。
Over sixty percent of the totals are policy letters and visits. Improper handling can easily have a negative impact on the government department. This paper, through constructing evolutionary game model of government departments and the group of letters and visits,discussed the strategy choice,the dynamic game process and the evolutionary stable strategy. The result shows that the choice of either strategy effects the other side;that the strategy of government should be based on the group of letters and visits＇ strategy ; Adjust the parameters and the game strategy combination can make the combination of strategies move towards the ideal regional transformation. Finally, the paper put forward some suggestions on dealing with policy letters and visits.
出处
《技术与创新管理》
2015年第5期492-497,共6页
Technology and Innovation Management
基金
上海理工大学"攀登计划"项目(1F14303115)
关键词
政策性信访
演化博弈
雅可比矩阵
演化稳定策略
policy letters and visits
evolutionary game
jacobin matrix
evolutionarily stable strategy
