摘要
本文选取2009-2012年沪深两市创业板和中小板上市公司为研究对象,研究了创业投资参与对民营和国有企业高管薪酬契约的影响。实证研究发现:(1)创业投资能够显著改变民营企业高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性,但是创业投资并没有显著改变国有企业高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性;(2)对民营企业而言,创业投资参与降低了高管薪酬与会计业绩之间的敏感性,但是提高了高管薪酬与市场业绩敏感性。实证结果表明,创业投资在民营企业高管薪酬制定过程中发挥了作用,创业投资更加重视市场业绩在高管薪酬契约中的作用;创业投资对国有企业高管薪酬契约影响非常有限;创业投资参与民营和国有企业的动机可能存在差异。
In more recent years, venture capital has achieved rapid development and made great progress in China. However, whether venture capital could play an effective governance role in China is still an open question. Using a sample of IPO listed companies from Small-Medium board and Chi Next from 2009 to 2012, this article empirically examines how venture capital affects the compensation contract design of the senior executives in both Chinese state owned and private enterprises. The main findings of this study are as follows： First, venture capital in China can significantly enhance the sensitivity of the relationship between senior executives＇ pay and performance in private enterprise, but it cannot significantly improve the sensitivity of the relationship between the sensitivity between senior executives＇ pay and performance in state owned enterprise, which indicates that it is different in the mechanism that determine the compensation contract of senior executives of state owned enterprise and private enterprise; Second, for private enterprise, venture capital decreases the sensitivity of the relationship between senior executives＇ pay and accounting performance, but it increases the sensitivity of the relationship between senior executives＇ pay and market performance. These empirical results indicate that（1） from the perspective of the compensation contract design of the senior executives, venture capital in China plays a better governance role in private enterprises than in that of state owned enterprises, suggesting that venture capital in China may have different motivation to invest in state owned enterprises and private enterprises;（2） venture capital in China emphasizes more on market performance than accounting performance, which is determined by the characteristics of investment of venture capital that the main target is achieving capital gain. Based on the above findings, this paper provides some important policy suggestions and management implications. It also enriches literature about
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期126-135,共10页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71173060)
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71031003)资助
关键词
创业投资
高管薪酬
民营企业
国有企业
薪酬业绩敏感性
Venture capital
Pay of senior executives
Private enterprise
State owned enterprise
Sensitivity between pay and performance
