摘要
利用我国2011—2015年间沪深两市高新技术企业为样本,分析了高管薪酬激励、可用冗余与研发投入的关系,并基于高管团队稳定状况对以上关系进行深入探讨。结果表明:可用冗余与研发投入正相关;高管薪酬水平与可用冗余正相关,并会负向调节可用冗余与研发投入的正向关系;可用冗余会降低高管薪酬业绩敏感性;当高管团队较稳定时,高管薪酬水平对可用冗余与研发投入关系所起的负向调节效应更加显著。在区分最终控制人性质后,发现以上结论均在非国企中更为显著。
Based on the data of China＇s high-tech listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2011 to 2015, this paper examines the relationship among executive compensation incentives, available slack and R＆D investment. And then according to the stability condition of TMT, this paper explores the above relationships in more detail. The results are shown below. Available slack is positively related to R＆D invest- ment. Besides, executive compensation is positively related to available slack and will weaken the positive rela- tionship between available slack and R＆D investment. We also find that available slack can reduce executive compensation-for-performance sensitivity. In addition, when the TMT is relatively stable, the negative moderating effect of the executive compensation on the relationship between available slack and R＆D investment is even more significant. After distinguishing the nature of the ultimate controller, it is found that the above conclusions are all more pronounced in non-SOEs
作者
朱芳芳
ZHU Fangfang(Graduate School,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China)
出处
《科学学与科学技术管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第9期120-136,共17页
Science of Science and Management of S.& T.
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71602082)
国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL081)
教育部人文社会科学研究基金青年项目(16YJC630148)
关键词
可用冗余
研发投入
高管薪酬水平
高管薪酬业绩敏感性
高管团队稳定
available slack
R＆D investment
executive compensation
executive compensation-for-performance sensitivity
TMT stability
