摘要
在企业并购活动中,签订估值调整协议(俗称对赌协议)的现象越来越普遍,这种对企业短期业绩作出承诺的行为是否会影响企业研发创新?为了回答该问题,本文基于2010—2020年中国A股上市公司并购交易数据,运用双重差分等方法进行了研究,结果显示:签订对赌协议对并购后企业的创新水平具有显著抑制作用,并且这种负面影响在非国有企业和高新技术企业中表现得更加明显。通过对对赌协议进行特征剖析,发现对赌成功、业绩完成比例越高、采用现金补偿和双向补偿的企业,其创新水平越低。进一步检验后发现,企业创新在对赌协议与长期绩效之间起中介作用,即对赌协议会通过影响企业创新,从而抑制长期绩效。相关结论对于企业理性对待对赌决策,具有一定的启示意义。
In corporate mergers and acguisitions,the phenomenon of signing VAM agreements is becoming more and more common.Will this behavior of making short-term performance commitments affect corporate R&D innovation?In order to answer this question,based on the M&A transaction data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020,this paper uses double difference and other methods to conduct research.The results show that the signing of VAM agreements has a significant inhibitory effect on the innovation level of enterprises after M&A,and this negative impact is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises and high-tech enterprises.Through the analysis of the characteristics of the gambling agreement,it is found that the enterprises with successful gambling,higher performance completion ratio,and cash compensation and two-way compensa tion have lower innovation levels.After further testing,it is found that corporate innovation plays a mediating role between VAM agreements and long-term performance,that is,VAM agreements can inhibit long term performance by affecting corporate innovation.The relevant conclusions have certain enlightening significance for enterprises to rationally treat gambling decisions.
作者
蒋大双
刘春济
Dashuang Jiang;Chuji Liu(School of Finance and Business,Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234,China)
出处
《金融管理研究》
2023年第1期128-151,共24页
The Journal of Finance and Management Research
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“创新驱动战略视角下高校科技成果转化的体制与机制改革研究”(批准号AIA180010)
关键词
并购
对赌协议
企业创新
M&A
gambling agreement
corporate innovation
