摘要
是否存在否定事实这个问题自1914年罗素首先提出后就一直受到哲学家们的关注与讨论,在当代,因其与真理论(特别是使真者理论)以及形而上学的关联而更受到哲学家们的重视。在使真者理论的语境下,否定事实被看作是为了解释否定真理而必须承诺的。哲学家们已经探寻了几种拒斥否定事实的策略,最主要的有不相容解决和不相同解决,但这些策略似乎都面临着通常刻画下的使真者必然主义的难题。绝大部分关注此问题的哲学家因此认为存在否定事实,但本文试图表明问题出在对使真者必然主义的通常刻画上。当拒斥上述通常刻画后,否定事实其存在的必要性不复存在。
Whether there are negative facts has sions since Russell raised such question in aroused philosophers＇ concerns and discus- 1914, and has received more attention at the present times since its association with the Theory of Truth （in particularly, the Truth- maker Theory） and Metaphysics. In the context of the Truthmaker Theory, negative facts are viewed as something we have to make promise so that we can explain the negative truth. Philosophers have explored several strategies to reject negative facts among which the Incompatibility Solution and the Difference Solution are the most important. How- ever, these strategies all face the challenge of Truthmaker Necessitarianism in general depiction. Therefore, most of the philosophers who pay attention on the question believe that negative facts do exist. In this paper, I want to argue that the general depiction of Truthmaker Necessitarianism should take the responsibility. Once we reject such general depiction, the necessity of the existence of negative facts does not exist.
出处
《逻辑学研究》
CSSCI
2014年第3期70-84,共15页
Studies in Logic
基金
中国博士后科学基金资助项目(项目号:2014M551417)
复旦大学"985工程"三期整体推进人文学科研究项目(项目号:2011RWXKY-041)
