期刊文献+

反驳克里普克的模态论证 被引量:8

A Refutation of Kripke's Modal Argument
下载PDF
导出
摘要 对克里普克的模态论证及其相关环节做了详尽的批判性考察,得出如下结论:(1)关于严格性的直观测试行不通,其中存在一个不合法的跳跃:从"一个对象必定自我同一"这个形而上学论断跳到一个语言哲学命题"一个名称是一个对象的严格指示词";(2)关于严格性的精确定义与引出严格指示词的语言直观相冲突;(3)反驳描述论的模态论证不成立:所谓的"严格指示词"可以归结为在模态语境中取宽辖域的非严格的名称;假设真有所谓的"严格指示词"的话,限定摹状词也可以被严格化,我们仍没有理由否认名称是相应摹状词的缩写。(4)克里普克对关于他的模态论证的宽辖域批评所做的回应也是失败的。所有这些结论都依赖于一个隐含前提:名称和摹状词在模态语境中可以取宽辖域或窄辖域,而此前提在本文中得到了论证。 Kripke's modal argument and its relevant elements are carefully and critically examined in this paper.The following conclusions are reached:(1) His intuitive tests of rigidity does not work,because they involve at least an improper transition from a metaphysical thesis that any object cannot but have been self-identical to a claim in the philosophy of language that a name is a rigid designator of an object.(2)His precise definition of rigidity is incompatible with his linguistic intuition from which his notion of a rigid designator is derived.(3)His modal argument fails.So called rigid designators can be reduced to non-rigid names with a wide scope in modal contexts.Supposing that there really were rigid designators,definite descriptions could be rigidified to refer to some particular individuals in the actual world,and to refer to the same individuals in all possible worlds.Thus,we still have no reason to deny an interpretation of a name as the abbreviation of such description(s).(4)His response to the wide-scope critics of his modal argument also fails.All these conclusions depends on an implicit premise that names and definite descriptions can both take wide scope and narrow scope over modalities,which has been argued in this paper.
作者 陈波
出处 《晋阳学刊》 CSSCI 2012年第3期70-82,共13页 Academic Journal of Jinyang
基金 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地(北京大学外国哲学研究所)项目"对克里普克语言哲学的系统性质疑和对一种新理论的建构"的研究成果 项目批准号:11JJD720001
关键词 严格指示词 直观测试 精确定义 模态论证 宽辖域 窄辖域 严格化的摹状词 Rigid designator Intuitive tests of rigidity Precise definition of rigidity Modal argument Wide scope Narrow scope Rigidified description
  • 相关文献

参考文献14

  • 1Everett, A. (2005). Recent Defenses of Descriptivism, Mind & Language, Vol.20, No. 1, 103-139. 被引量:1
  • 2Kripke, S (1980). Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; paperback edition, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1981 ). 被引量:1
  • 3Dummett, M. (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language (New York, NY: Harper & Row, first edition, 1973; second edi- tion, 1981 ), Appendix to Chap. 5: Note on an Attempted Refutation of Frege, 1 10-151. 被引量:1
  • 4Stanley, J. (1997). Names and Rigid Designation, in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 555-585. 被引量:1
  • 5Russell, B. (1919). Introduction to Mathematical Philoso- phy (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1919; Second edition, 1920). 被引量:1
  • 6Kripke, S. (1971). Identity and Necessity, abbreviated as IN in present paper, in M. K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and In- dividuation(New York, NY: New York University Press, 1971 ), pp.135-64. 被引量:1
  • 7Salmon, N. (1982). Reference and Essence (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1982; second edition, Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2005). 被引量:1
  • 8Sosa, D. (2001). Rigidity in the Scope of Rusell's Theo- ry, lVou~, Voi.35, No.l, 1-38. 被引量:1
  • 9Fitch, G. W. (2004). Saul Kripke (Durham, UK: Acumen Pub-lishing Limited, 2004). 被引量:1
  • 10Dummett, M. (1981 ). The Interpretation ofFrege's Philoso- phy (London, UK: Duckworth, 1981), Chap.9 and 10, 182-195, and Appendices, 557-603. 被引量:1

同被引文献56

引证文献8

二级引证文献9

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部