摘要
直接指称论的反描述论论证主要有三种,即模态论证、认识论论证和语义学论证。多数语言哲学家相信,这三个论证对于反驳一般的关于物理对象名字的指称描述论是有效的。但是,三个论证对于一种可能的虚构对象名字的描述论是否有效,是一个需要讨论的问题。本文根据虚构对象名字在语义上依赖于性质描述的特点,根据这种描述所产生的模态性质、认识论性质和语义学性质,最终得出否定性的结论:三个反描述论论证对于反驳虚构对象名字的描述理论是无效的。因此,对于反驳描述理论来说,如果直接指称论者使用的三个论证确实具有不可替代的作用,则至少对于某些种类的名字,指称的描述理论得到了一定程度的支持。
Most of language philosophers,even advocates of descriptivism,agree that for names of ordinary objects modal argument,epistemological argument,and semantic argument effectively call description theory of reference in question.However,for names of fictional objects the effectiveness of the three arguments as the main arguments against descriptivismis left open.In this paper a negative answer of the problem is explicitly developed,the answer that depends on the fact that the intuitions and linguistic facts Kriple and other theorists of direct reference used in the three arguments fail to challenge consequences of descriptivism of fictional names substantively because fictional objects have crucially different properties from those of ordinary objects.If the three arguments are indispensable to arguing against description theory and for direct reference theory then the negative answer means that at least for fictional names,descriptivistscan keep out of the Millean attack.
出处
《世界哲学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期85-96,161,共12页
World Philosophy