摘要
重点研究公共建筑中模拟工程量清单的应用问题,以模拟工程量清单应用中的问题现状为出发点,分析了导致模拟工程量清单出现问题的表层原因,结合制度经济学和合同管理、成本等理论探讨了承包方和发包方为规避风险,采取模拟工程量清单时的行为模式及深层原因,同时,以案例研究来验证文中提出的观点。文章提出了国内模拟工程量清单的不确定性易引发承包人的投机行为以及合同条款的不完善,提出公共建筑的建设中发包人应权衡利弊,慎重使用模拟工程量清单,或采用联盟等采购方式抑制投机行为。
This paper analyzes the problems in the use of bills of approximate quantities based on similar buildings, especially public buildings. The reasons for behavior patterns to avoid risk by general contractor and subcontractor are discussed by employing institutional economics, contract management, and cost theory with a case study. The results show that the uncertainty of the bills of approximate quantities induces the opportunism of contractor. The employers should evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the bills of approximate quantities in the context of public buildings. The employers may adopt alliances to reduce opportunistic behavior.
出处
《工程管理学报》
2011年第6期624-628,共5页
Journal of Engineering Management
关键词
模拟工程量清单
投机行为
资产专用性
合同条款
bills of approximate quantities
opportunistic behavior
asset specialty
contract terms
