摘要
为研究减少战略联盟中机会主义行为和提高联盟收益的策略与方法,基于专有性资源的溢出效应,利用演化博弈理论建立以机会主义者比例和发生合作溢出的互惠主义者比例为参数的复制者动态方程,分析了联盟稳定平衡点下机会主义者和互惠主义者的相互演化规律和机会主义对于联盟收益的影响机理。研究表明,无合作溢出时机会主义者主宰整个联盟系统,一定的合作溢出量可以减少机会主义行为的发生,但随着合作溢出量的增加联盟整体收益将会降低,而政府部门可以通过适当补贴提高联盟收益。
Enterprises in the market economy and knowledge society are forming strategic alliance with each other in order to obtain necessary skills and capabilities.Strategic alliance opportunities inevitably create opportunistic and self-interest behaviors,thereby resulting in disorderly competition and reduced alliance profit.It is important to learn how to develop a healthy alliance by reducing opportunism behaviors and improving alliance profits.In reality,alliance members tend to take effective supervisory and preventive measures to avoid cooperative spillover of exclusion resource,and reduce or avoid the loss of their own interests.Therefore,research of alliance stability and alliance income should be based on at least two aspects： supervisory and preventive measures,as well as cooperative spillover of exclusion resource. The current research on alliance and opportunism behaviors of alliance members is mainly based on single factor,such as information symmetry,supervision and prevention,external environment,cooperative spillover effect of exclusion resource,trust or culture.Two or more influencing factors were rarely considered at the same time.According to the evolutionary game theory,this paper uses a replicator equation as our basic model to characterize the change of opportunist proportion and mutually beneficial proportion when cooperative spillover occurs.We also analyze evolution laws under stable alliance equilibrium,and potential influence of cooperative spillover on alliance profits. In the first part we construct an alliance system that is created by many individuals.The evolutionary game model is based on exclusion resources that takes opportunist proportion in alliance and mutually beneficial proportion.In the second part,we calculate the stable alliance equilibrium point and study the evolution law of opportunistic behavior according to the Jacobin matrix.Excessive prevention cost can stop cooperative spillover of mutually beneficial cooperation from happening when opportunists dominate alliance syst
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第3期68-72,共5页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJSK100043
CDJRC10010004)
关键词
合作溢出
机会主义行为
联盟收益
演化博弈
cooperative spillover
opportunistic behavior
alliance benefit
evolutionary game
