摘要
在政府补贴机制下,本文构建了基于生物进化理论的研发外包演化博弈模型,并分析了该系统均衡解的结构和策略选择的动态演变过程。研究表明,策略演变过程中存在一个"策略跃迁点",政府补贴高于"策略跃迁点"时,博弈双方才都选择坚持合作策略。政府补贴不断增加的过程中,寡头企业的策略选择较为稳定,而研发机构的策略选择演化过程较为复杂,收敛时间先增大后减小,其中博弈模型中出现的混沌效应可将整个过程划分为策略稳定期、策略混沌期、策略稳定期三个部分。政府补贴应合理避开策略混沌期。
Open innovation can promote the combination of enterprise innovation resources in time and space, and in both quality and quantity. As such, openinnovation has gradually become an important way to create values for enterprises. Research and development （R＆D） outsourcing, which redefines competitivestrategy and structure of the enterprises, is being integrated into the global economy chain by using opening and dynamic technology innovation modes. Itbecomes an important mean of open innovation under the current competitive market environment. In the knowledge-intensive industry, the risk of informationleakage is particularly prominent. Due to nonexclusive knowledge, it is difficult to prevent information leakage by non-disclosure clauses or the Trade SecretsAct in the process of information exchange. The concept of social control, which belongs to moral constraints of game players, is put forward to avoid the risk of information leakage. However, it isvery difficult to achieve the expected effect, under the principle of seeking to maximize their own interests. The govemment supervision mechanism is proposedto solve the problem of information leakage, but the actual effect is not ideal because of high running cost of the mechanism. In this paper, the game players＇behavioral decisions are thoroughly analyzed from the perspective of the government subsidy mechanism. Reducing the risk of information leakage andenhancing cooperation stability can provide significant reference for the government to enact a reasonable subsidy policy. In the first part, assumptions are proposed for the model, and the profit functions of oligopoly and R＆D institution are built. In the second part, accordingto the evolutionary game theory a replicator equation is used as a basic model to characterize the selection and evolution path of group strategy in oligopoliesand R＆D institutions based on government R＆D subsidy. The stable equilibrium point is calculated and the evolution stable strategy of behavior is obtainedfrom the Jac
作者
汪勇杰
陈通
邓斌超
WANG Yong-jie CHEN Tong DENG Bin-chao(College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, Chin)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第2期137-142,共6页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272148)
天津市科技发展战略研究计划资助项目(12ZLZLZF02600)
关键词
政府补贴
研发外包
演化博弈
策略跃迁点
混沌
Government subsidy
R＆D outsourcing
Evolutionary game theory
The strategy transition point
Chaos
