摘要
本文通过采集2005～2008年11家已上市的全国股份制商业银行的数据,实证分析了银行董事会独立性与CEO报酬之间的关系,并在考虑银行CEO报酬内生性基础上,进一步检验了银行董事会独立性、CEO报酬和银行绩效的关系。研究结果显示:长任期的CEO、CEO兼任董事长、较大比例的内部董事和较大的董事会规模构成了中国上市银行的监管障碍。银行CEO的高薪酬是不足为奇的,因为高薪酬对应的是银行业绩的显著增长。CEO报酬是银行公司治理的强化机制,授予银行CEO合理的激励报酬可以克服银行监管障碍,提高银行治理水平。
With the data of 11 Chinese listed commercial banks from 2005 to 2008, the paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the independence of board and CEO compensation and further examines the relationship among board independence, CEO compensation and bank performance with consideration of the endogeneity of CEO compensation. The results show that CEO with long tenure, CEO who concurrently holds chairman of the board, higher proportion of inside directors in board and larger board pose obstacles to supervising Chinese listed banks. The high compensation of CEO is not surprising, because the high compensation corresponds to a significant increase of bank performance. The results imply that CEO compensation is a reinforcing mechanism of corporate governance, so granting CEO with incentive compensation can overcome supervision obstacles and improve bank＇s governance.
出处
《金融论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期36-42,共7页
Finance Forum
基金
国家杰出青年基金项目“企业理论”(项目编号:70525005)的阶段性成果
关键词
商业银行
董事
董事会特征
CEO报酬
银行绩效
公司治理
commercial bank
directors
characteristics of board of directors
CEO Compensation
bank performance
corporate governance
