摘要
从公司治理角度，董事会作为商业银行的决策机构能影响银行在货币政策冲击下的贷款行为。为验证这一结论，本文选取2003～2010年中国84家商业银行的相关数据，分析商业银行董事会特征对货币政策传导的银行贷款渠道的影响。结果表明：董事会规模和独立性差异影响了银行贷款行为对货币政策冲击的反应，董事会规模越大、独立性越高的银行，其信贷行为对货币政策反应越不敏感；这种差异并不是由于董事会下设委员会和董事会会议等董事会职能行使方式差异造成的，董事会作为银行决策机构对货币政策冲击下银行贷款行为调整的影响作用没有得到充分发挥。
17rum the perspective of bank governance, the board of bank directors, which is the decision maker of bank, can influence the bank lending behavior when monetary policy impacts the bank. To examine this theory, this paper selects the data of the Chinese 84 commercial banks during 2003-2010 to analyze the influence of the board characteristics of bank directors on bank lendiug, the transmission channel of monetary policy. The results show that the difference in the size and independence of the board of directors affect the reaction of the bank lending behavior to the influence of the monetary policy. The larger the size is, and the more independent the bank is, the less sensitive the reaction. The further research shows that the reason of the above difference is not because the difference in the exertion ways of the board functions, such as the sub-committees of the board and board conferences, etc., and the board of directors, as the decision maker of bank, does not exert its full influence on the adjustment of the bank lending behavior when monetary policy impacts the bank.
出处
《金融论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第8期47-54,共8页
Finance Forum
基金
国家社科基金重大招标项目(10ZD&035)
国家自然科学基金项目(71272119)
教育部人文社科基金项目(12YJA790005)的部分研究成果
关键词
商业银行
董事会
银行贷款
货币政策传导
commercial bank
board of director
bank lending
transmission of monetary policy
